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The Works Of The Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. IX. (of 12) written by Edmund Burke

E >> Edmund Burke >> The Works Of The Right Honourable Edmund Burke, Vol. IX. (of 12)




That the said Warren Hastings, having taken the measures hereinbefore
described for supporting those of the Presidency of Bombay, did, on the
23d of March, 1778, "invest the said Presidency with authority to form
a new alliance with Ragoba, and to engage with him in _any_ scheme which
they should deem expedient and safe for retrieving his affairs." That
the said Hastings was then in possession of a letter from the Court of
Directors, dated the 4th of July, 1777, containing a positive order to
the Presidency of Bombay in the following words. "Though that treaty"
(meaning the treaty of Poorunder) "is not, upon the whole, so agreeable
to us as we could wish, still we are resolved strictly to adhere to it
on our parts. You must therefore be particularly vigilant, while Ragoba
is with you, to prevent him from forming any plan against what is called
the ministerial party at Poonah; and we hereby positively order you not
to engage with him in any scheme whatever in retrieving his affairs,
without the consent of the Governor-General and Council, or the Court of
Directors." That the said Ragoba neither did or could form any plan for
his restoration but what was and must be against the ministerial party
at Poonah, who held and exercised the regency of that state in the
infancy of the Peshwa; and that, supposing him to have formed any other
_scheme_, in conjunction with Bombay, _for retrieving his affairs_, the
said Hastings, in giving a previous _general_ authority to the
Presidency of Bombay to engage with Ragoba in _any_ scheme for that
purpose, without knowing what such scheme might be, and thereby
relinquishing and transferring to the discretion of a subordinate
government that superintendence and control over all measures tending to
create or provoke a war which the law had exclusively vested in the
Governor-General and Council, was guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanor.

That the said Warren Hastings, having first declared that the measures
taken by him were for the support of the engagements made by the
Presidency of Bombay in favor of Ragoba, did afterwards, when it
appeared that those negotiations were _entirely laid aside_, declare
that his apprehension of the consequence of a pretended _intrigue_
between the Mahrattas and the French _was the sole motive of all the
late measures taken for the support of the Presidency of Bombay_; but
that neither of the preceding declarations contained the true motives
and objects of the said Hastings, whose real purpose, as it appeared
soon after, was, to make use of the superiority of the British power in
India to carry on offensive wars, and to pursue schemes of conquest,
impolitic and unjust in their design, ill-concerted in the execution,
and which, as this House has resolved, _have brought great calamities on
India, and enormous expenses on the East India Company_.

That the said Warren Hastings, on the 22d of June, 1778, made the
following declaration in Council. "Much less can I agree, that, with
such superior advantages as we possess over every power which can oppose
us, we should act _merely on the defensive_. On the contrary, if it be
really true that the British arms and influence have suffered so severe
a check in the Western world, it is more incumbent on those who are
charged with the interests of Great Britain in the East _to exert
themselves for the retrieval of the national loss_. We have the means in
our power, and, if they are not frustrated by our own dissensions, I
trust that the event of this expedition will yield every advantage _for
the attainment of which it was undertaken_."

That, in pursuance of the principles avowed in the preceding
declaration, the said Warren Hastings, on the 9th of July, 1778, did
propose and carry it in Council, that an embassy should be sent from
Bengal to Moodajee Boosla, the Rajah of Berar,--falsely asserting that
the said Rajah "was, by interest and inclination, likely to join in an
alliance with the British government, and suggesting that two advantages
might be offered to him as the inducements to it: first, the support of
his pretensions to the sovereign power" (viz., of the Mahratta empire);
"second, the recovery of the captures made on his dominions by Nizam
Ali." That the said Hastings, having already given full authority to the
Presidency of Bombay to engage the British faith to Ragonaut Row to
support him in _his_ pretensions to the government or to the regency of
the Mahratta empire, was guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor in
proposing to engage the same British faith to support the pretensions of
another competitor for the same object; and that, in offering to assist
the Rajah of Berar to recover the captures made on his dominions by the
Nizam, the said Hastings did endeavor, as far as depended on him, to
engage the British nation in a most unjust and utterly unprovoked war
against the said Nizam, between whom and the East India Company a treaty
of peace and friendship did then subsist, unviolated on his
part,--notwithstanding the said Hastings well knew that it made part of
the East India Company's fundamental policy to support that prince
against the Mahrattas, and _to consider him as one of the few remaining
chiefs who were yet capable of coping with the Mahrattas_, and that it
was the Company's _true interest to preserve a good understanding with
him_. That, by holding out such offers to the Rajah of Berar, the said
Hastings professed to hope that the Rajah _would ardently catch at the
objects presented to his ambition_: and although the said Hastings did
about this time lay it down as a maxim that _there is always a greater
advantage in receiving solicitations than in making advances_, he
nevertheless declared to the said Rajah that _in the whole of his
conduct he had departed from the common line of policy, and had made
advances where others in his situation would have waited for
solicitation_. That the said unjust and dangerous projects did not take
effect, because the Rajah of Berar refused to join or be concerned
therein; yet so earnest was the said Hastings for the execution of those
projects, that in a subsequent letter he daringly and treacherously
assured the Rajah, "that, if he had accepted of the terms offered him by
Colonel Goddard, and concluded a treaty with the government of Bengal
upon them, he should have held the obligation of it superior to that of
any engagement formed by the government of Bombay, and should have
thought it his duty to maintain it, &c., against every consideration
_even of the most valuable interests and safety of the English
possessions intrusted to his charge_." That all the offers of the said
Hastings were rejected with slight and contempt by the Rajah of Berar;
but the same being discovered, and generally known throughout India, did
fill the chief of the princes and states of India with a general
suspicion and distrust of the ambitious designs and treacherous
principles of the British government, and with an universal hatred of
the British nation. That the said princes and states were thereby so
thoroughly convinced of the necessity of uniting amongst themselves to
oppose a power which kept no faith with any of them, and equally
threatened them all, that, renouncing all former enmities against each
other, they united in a common confederacy against the English, viz.:
the Peshwa, as representative of the Mahratta state, and Moodajee
Boosla, the Rajah of Berar, that is, the principal Hindoo powers of
India, on one side; and Hyder Ali, and the Nizam of the Deccan, that is,
the principal Mahomedan powers of India, on the other: and that in
consequence of this confederacy Hyder Ali invaded, overran, and ruined
the Carnatic; and that Moodajee Boosla, instead of _ardently catching at
the objects presented to his ambition_ by the said Hastings, sent an
army to the frontiers of Bengal,--which army the said Warren Hastings
was at length forced to buy off with twenty-six lacs of rupees, or
300,000_l._ sterling, after a series of negotiations with the Mahratta
chiefs who commanded that army, founded and conducted on principles so
dishonorable to the British name and character, that the Secret
Committee of the House of Commons, by whom the rest of the proceedings
in that business were reported to the House, _have upon due
consideration thought it proper to leave out the letter of instructions
to Mr. Anderson_, viz., those given by the said Warren Hastings to the
representative of the British government, and concerning which the said
committee have reported in the following terms: "The schemes of policy
by which the Governor-General seems to have dictated the instructions he
gave to Mr. Anderson" (the gentleman deputed) "will also appear in this
document, as well respecting the particular succession to the _rauje_,
as also the mode of accommodating the demand of _chout_, the
establishment of which was apparently the great aim of Moodajee's
political manoeuvres, while the Governor-General's wish to defeat it was
avowedly more intent on the removal of a nominal disgrace than on the
anxiety or resolution to be freed from an expensive, if an unavoidable
incumbrance."

That, while the said Warren Hastings was endeavoring to persuade the
Rajah of Berar to engage with him in a scheme to place the said Rajah at
the head of the Mahratta empire, the Presidency of Bombay, by virtue of
the powers specially vested in them for that purpose by the said
Hastings, did really engage with Ragonaut Row, the other competitor for
the same object, and sent a great part of their military force,
established for the defence of Bombay, on an expedition with Ragonaut
Row, to invade the dominions of the Peshwa, and to take Poonah, the
capital thereof; that this army, being surrounded and overpowered by the
Mahrattas, was obliged to capitulate; and then, through the moderation
of the Mahrattas, was permitted to return quietly, but _very
disgracefully_, to Bombay. That, supposing the said Warren Hastings
could have been justified in abandoning the project of reinstating
Ragonaut Row, which he at first authorized and promised to support, and
in preferring a scheme to place the Rajah of Berar at the head of the
Mahratta empire, he was bound by his duty, as well as injustice to the
Presidency of Bombay, to give that Presidency timely notice of such his
intention, and to have restrained them positively from resuming their
own project; that, on the contrary, the said Warren Hastings did, on the
17th of August, 1778, again _authorize_ the said Presidency "to assist
Ragoba with a military force to conduct him to Poonah, and to establish
him in the regency there," and, so far from communicating his change of
plan to Bombay, did keep it concealed from that Presidency, insomuch
that, even so late as the 19th of February, 1779, William Hornby, then
Governor of Bombay, declared in Council his total ignorance of the
schemes of the said Hastings in the following terms: "The schemes of the
Governor-General and Council with regard to the Rajah of Berar _being
yet unknown to us_, it is impossible for us to found any measures on
them; yet I cannot help now observing, that, if, as has been
conjectured, the gentleman of that Presidency have entertained thoughts
of restoring, in his person, the ancient Rajah government, the attempt
seems likely to be attended with no small difficulty." That, whereas the
said Warren Hastings did repeatedly affirm that it was his intention to
support the plan formed by the Presidency of Bombay in favor of Ragoba,
and did repeatedly authorize and encourage them to pursue it, he did
nevertheless, at the same time, in his letters and declarations to the
Peshwa, to the Nizam, and to the Rajah of Berar, falsely and
perfidiously affirm, _that it never was nor is designed by the English
chiefs to give support to Ragonaut Row,--that he_ (Hastings) _had no
idea of supporting Ragonaut Row,--and that the detachment he had sent to
Bombay was solely to awe the French, without the least design to assist
Ragonaut Row_. That, supposing it to have been the sole _professed_
intention of the said Hastings, in sending an army across India, to
protect Bombay against a Trench invasion, even that pretence was false,
and used only to cover the real design of the said Hastings, viz., to
engage in projects of war and conquest with the Rajah of Berar. That on
the 11th of October, 1778, he informed the said Rajah "that the
detachment would soon arrive in his territories, and depend on him
[Moodajee Boosla] for its subsequent operations"; that on the 7th of
December, 1778, the said Hastings revoked the powers he had before
given[19] to the Presidency of Bombay over the detachment, declaring
that the event of Colonel Goddard's negotiation with the Rajah of Berar
_was likely to cause a very speedy and essential change in the design
and operations of the detachment_; and that on the 4th of March, 1779,
the said Hastings, immediately after receiving advice of the defeat of
the Bombay army near Poonah, and when Bombay, if at any time,
particularly required to be protected against a French invasion, did
declare in Council that he _wished for the return of the detachment to
Berar, and dreaded to hear of its proceeding to the Malabar coast_: and
therefore, if the said Hastings did not think that Bombay was in danger
of being attacked by the French, he was guilty of repeated falsehoods in
affirming the contrary for the purpose of covering a criminal design;
or, if he thought that Bombay was immediately threatened with that
danger, he then was guilty of treachery in ordering an army necessary on
that supposition to the immediate defence of Bombay to halt in Berar, to
depend on the Rajah of Berar for its subsequent operations, or on _the
event of a negotiation_ with that prince, which, as the said Hastings
declared, _was likely to cause a very speedy and essential change in the
design and operations of the detachment_; and finally, in declaring that
_he dreaded to hear of the said detachment's proceeding to the Malabar
coast_, whither he ought to have ordered it to proceed without delay,
if, as he has solemnly affirmed, it was true that _he had been told by
the highest authority that a powerful armament had been prepared in
France, the first object of which was an attack upon Bombay, and that
he knew with moral certainty that all the powers of the adjacent
continent were ready to join the invasion_.

That through the whole of these transactions the said Warren Hastings
has been guilty of continued falsehood, fraud, contradiction, and
duplicity, highly dishonorable to the character of the British nation;
that, in consequence of the unjust and ill-concerted schemes of the said
Hastings, the British arms, heretofore respected in India, have suffered
repeated disgraces, and great calamities have been thereby brought upon
India; and that the said Warren Hastings, as well in exciting and
promoting the late unprovoked and unjustifiable war against the
Mahrattas, as in the conduct thereof, has been guilty of sundry high
crimes and misdemeanors.

That, by the definitive treaty of peace concluded with the Mahrattas at
Poorunder, on the 1st of March, 1776, the Mahrattas gave up all right
and title to the island of Salsette, unjustly taken from them by the
Presidency of Bombay; did also give up to the English Company forever
all right and title to their entire shares of the city and purgunnah of
Baroach; did also give forever to the English Company a country of three
lacs of rupees revenue, near to Baroach; and did also agree to pay to
the Company twelve lacs of rupees, in part of the expenses of the
English army: and that the terms of the said treaty _were honorable and
advantageous to the India Company_.[20]

That Warren Hastings, having broken the said treaty, and forced the
Mahrattas into another war by a repeated invasion of their country, and
having conducted that war in the manner hereinbefore described, did, on
the 17th of May, 1782, by the agency of Mr. David Anderson, conclude
another treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance with the Mahrattas,
by which the said Hastings agreed to deliver up to them all the
countries, places, cities, and forts, particularly the island of
Bassein, (taken from the Peshwa during the war,) and to relinquish all
claim to the country of three lacs of rupees ceded to the Company by the
treaty of Poorunder; that the said Warren Hastings did also at the said
time, by a private and separate agreement, deliver up to Mahdajee Sindia
the whole of the city of Baroach,--that is, not only the share in the
said city which the India Company acquired by the treaty of Poorunder,
but the other share thereof which the India Company possessed for
several years before that treaty; and that among the reasons assigned by
Mr. David Anderson for totally stripping the Presidency of Bombay of all
their possessions on the Malabar coast, he has declared, "that, from the
general tenor of the _rest_ of the treaty, the settlement of Bombay
would be in future put on such a footing that it might well become a
question whether the possession of an inconsiderable territory without
forts would not be attended with more loss than advantage, as it must
necessarily occasion considerable expense, must require troops for its
defence, and might probably in the end lead, as Sindia apprehended, to a
renewal of war."

That the said Warren Hastings, having in this manner put an end to a war
commenced by him without provocation, and continued by him without
necessity, and having for that purpose made so many sacrifices to the
Mahrattas in points of essential interest to the India Company, did
consent and agree to other articles utterly dishonorable to the British
name and character, having sacrificed or abandoned every one of the
native princes who by _his_ solicitations and promises had been engaged
to take part with us in the war,--and that he did so without necessity:
since it appears that Sindia, the Mahratta chief who concluded the
treaty, _in every part of his conduct manifested a hearty desire of
establishing a peace_ with us; and that this was the disposition of all
the parties in the Mahratta confederacy, who were only kept together by
a general dread of their common enemy, the English, and who only waited
for a cessation of hostilities with us to return to their habitual and
permanent enmity against each other. That the Governor-General and
Council, in their letter of 31st August, 1781, made the following
declaration to the Court of Directors. "The Mahrattas have demanded the
sacrifice of the person of Ragonaut Row, the surrender of the fort and
territories of Ahmedabad, and of the fortress of Gualior, _which are not
ours to give, and which we could not wrest from the proprietors without
the greatest violation of public faith_. No state of affairs, in our
opinions, could warrant our acquiescence to such requisition; and we are
morally certain, that, had we yielded to them, such a consciousness of
the state of our affairs would have been implied as would have produced
an effect the very reverse from that for which it was intended, by
raising the presumption of the enemy to exact yet more _ignominious_
terms, or perhaps their refusal to accept of any; nor, in our opinion,
would they have failed to excite in others the same belief, and the
consequent decision of all parties against us, as the natural
consequences of our decline." That the said Hastings himself, in his
instructions to Mr. David Anderson, after authorizing him to restore
_all_ that we had conquered during the war, expressly "_excepted_
Ahmedabad, and the territory conquered for Futty Sing Gwicowar." That,
nevertheless, the said Hastings, in the peace concluded by him, has
yielded to every one of the conditions reprobated in the preceding
declarations as _ignominious_ and incompatible with public faith.

That the said Warren Hastings did abandon the Ranna of Gohud in the
manner already charged; and that the said Ranna has not only lost the
fort of Gualior, but all his own country, and is himself a prisoner.
That the said Hastings did not interpose to obtain any terms in favor of
the Nabob of Bopaul, who was _with great reason desirous of concealing
from the Mahrattas the attachment he had borne to the English
government_:[21] the said Nabob having a just dread of the danger of
being exposed to the resentment of the Mahrattas, and no dependence on
the faith and protection of the English. That by the ninth article of
the treaty with Futty Sing it was stipulated, that, when a negotiation
for peace should take place, his interest should be primarily
considered; and that Mr. David Anderson, the minister and representative
of the Governor-General and Council, did declare to Sindia, that it was
indispensably incumbent on us to support Futty Sing's rights: that,
nevertheless, every acquisition made for or by the said Futty Sing
during the war, particularly _the fort and territories of Ahmedabad_,
were given up by the said Hastings; that Futty Sing was replaced under
the subjection of the Peshwa, (whose resentment he had provoked by
taking part with us in the war,) and under an obligation to pay a
tribute, not specified, to the Peshwa, and to perform such services and
to be subject to such obedience _as had long been established and
customary_; and that, no limit being fixed to such tribute or services,
the said Futty Sing has been left wholly at the mercy of the Mahrattas.

That, with respect to Ragoba, the said Hastings, in his instructions to
Mr. Anderson, dated 4th of November, 1781, contented himself with
saying, "We cannot _totally_ abandon the interests of Ragonaut Row.
Endeavor to obtain for him an adequate provision." That Mr. Anderson
declared to Mahdajee Sindia,[22] "that, as we had given Ragoba
protection as an independent prince, and not brought him into our
settlement as a prisoner, we could not _in honor_ pretend to impose the
_smallest_ restraint on his will, and he must be at liberty to go
wherever he pleased; that it must rest with Sindia himself to prevail on
him to reside in his country: all that we could do was to _agree_, after
a reasonable time, _to withdraw our protection from him, and not to
insist on the payment of the stipend to him_, as Sindia had proposed,
unless on the condition of his residing in some part of Sindia's
territories."

That, notwithstanding all the preceding declarations, and in violation
of the public faith repeatedly pledged to Ragoba, he was totally
abandoned by the said Hastings in the treaty, no provision whatever
being made even for his subsistence, but on a condition to which he
could not submit without the certain loss of his liberty and probable
hazard of his life, namely, _that he should voluntarily and of his own
accord repair to Sindia, and quietly reside with him_. That such
treacherous desertion of the said Ragoba is not capable of being
justified by any plea of necessity: but that in fact no such necessity
existed; since it appears that the Nizam, who of all the contracting
parties in the confederacy was personally most hostile to Ragoba, did
himself _propose that Ragoba, might have an option given him_ of
residing within the Company's territories.

That the plan of negotiating a peace with the Mahrattas by application
to Sindia, and through his mediation, was earnestly recommended to the
said Hastings by the Presidency of Bombay so early as in February, 1779,
who stated clearly to him the reasons why such application ought to be
made to Sindia in preference to any other of the Mahratta chiefs, and
why it would probably be successful; the truth and justice of which
reasons were fully evinced in the issue, when the said Hastings, after
incurring, by two years' delay, all the losses and distresses of a
calamitous war, did actually pursue that very plan with much less effect
or advantage than might have been obtained at the time the advice was
given. That he neglected the advice of the Presidency of Bombay, and
retarded the peace, as well as made its conditions worse, from an
obstinate attachment to his project of an alliance offensive and
defensive with the Rajah of Berar, the object of which was rather a new
war than a termination of the war then existing against the Peshwa.

That the said Hastings did further embarrass and retard the conclusion
of a peace by employing different ministers at the courts of the several
confederate powers, whom he severally empowered to treat and negotiate
a peace. That these ministers, not acting in concert, not knowing the
extent of each other's commissions, and having no instructions to
communicate their respective proceedings to each other, did in effect
counteract their several negotiations. That this want of concert and of
simplicity, and the mystery and intricacy in the mode of conducting the
negotiation on our part, was complained of by our ministers as
embarrassing and disconcerting to us, while it was advantageous to the
adverse party, who were thereby furnished with opportunity and pretence
for delay, when it suited their purpose, and enabled to play off one set
of negotiators against another; that it also created jealousy and
distrust in the various contending parties, with whom we were treating
at the same time, and to whom we were obliged to make contradictory
professions, while it betrayed and exposed to them all our own eagerness
and impatience for peace, raising thereby the general claims and
pretensions of the enemy. That, while Dalhousie Watherston, Esquire, was
treating at Poonah, and David Anderson, Esquire, in Sindia's camp, with
separate powers applied to the same object, the minister at Poonah
informed the said Watherston, that he had received proposals for peace
from the Nabob of Arcot with the approbation of Sir Eyre Coote; that he
had returned other proposals to the said Nabob of Arcot, who had assured
him, the minister, that those proposals _would be acceded to, and that
Mr. Macpherson would set out for Bengal, after which orders should be
immediately dispatched from the Honorable the Governor-General and
Council to the effect he wished_; that the said Nabob "had promised to
obtain and forward to him the expected _orders from Bengal in fifteen
days_, and that he was therefore every instant in expectation of their
arrival,--and observed, that, when General Goddard proposed to send a
confidential person to Poonah, he conceived that those orders must have
actually reached him": that therefore the treaty formally concluded by
David Anderson was in effect and substance the same with that offered
and in reality concluded by the Nabob of Arcot, with the exception only
of Salsette, which the Nabob of Arcot had agreed to restore to the
Mahrattas.