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The Art of War written by Baron Henri de Jomini

B >> Baron Henri de Jomini >> The Art of War




We will apply this great principle to the different cases of strategy
and tactics, and then show, by the history of twenty celebrated
campaigns, that, with few exceptions, the most brilliant successes and
the greatest reverses resulted from an adherence to this principle in
the one case, and from a neglect of it in the other.




OF STRATEGIC COMBINATIONS.




ARTICLE XVI.

Of the System of Operations.


War once determined upon, the first point to be decided is, whether it
shall be offensive or defensive; and we will first explain what is meant
by these terms. There are several phases of the offensive: if against a
great state, the whole or a large portion of whose territory is
attacked, it is an _invasion_; if a province only, or a line of defense
of moderate extent, be assailed, it is the ordinary offensive; finally,
if the offensive is but an attack upon the enemy's position, and is
confined to a single operation, it is called the taking the
_initiative_. In a moral and political view, the offensive is nearly
always advantageous: it carries the war upon foreign soil, saves the
assailant's country from devastation, increases his resources and
diminishes those of his enemy, elevates the _morale_ of his army, and
generally depresses the adversary. It sometimes happens that invasion
excites the ardor and energy of the adversary,--particularly when he
feels that the independence of his country is threatened.

In a military point of view, the offensive has its good and its bad
side. Strategically, an invasion leads to deep lines of operations,
which are always dangerous in a hostile country. All the obstacles in
the enemy's country, the mountains, rivers, defiles, and forts, are
favorable for defense, while the inhabitants and authorities of the
country, so far from being the instruments of the invading army, are
generally hostile. However, if success be obtained, the enemy is struck
in a vital point: he is deprived of his resources and compelled to seek
a speedy termination of the contest.

For a single operation, which we have called the taking the
_initiative_, the offensive is almost always advantageous, particularly
in strategy. Indeed, if the art of war consists in throwing the masses
upon the decisive points, to do this it will be necessary to take the
initiative. The attacking party knows what he is doing and what he
desires to do; he leads his masses to the point where he desires to
strike. He who awaits the attack is everywhere anticipated: the enemy
fall with large force upon fractions of his force: he neither knows
where his adversary proposes to attack him nor in what manner to repel
him.

Tactically, the offensive also possesses advantages, but they are less
positive, since, the operations being upon a limited field, the party
taking the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who may detect
his designs and by the aid of good reserves cause them to fail.

The attacking party labors under the disadvantages arising from the
obstacles to be crossed before reaching the enemy's line; on which
account the advantages and disadvantages of the tactical offensive are
about equally balanced.

Whatever advantages may be expected either politically or strategically
from the offensive, it may not be possible to maintain it exclusively
throughout the war; for a campaign offensive in the beginning may become
defensive before it ends.

A defensive war is not without its advantages, when wisely conducted. It
may be passive or active, taking the offensive at times. The passive
defense is always pernicious; the active may accomplish great successes.
The object of a defensive war being to protect, as long as possible, the
country threatened by the enemy, all operations should be designed to
retard his progress, to annoy him in his enterprises by multiplying
obstacles and difficulties, without, however, compromising one's own
army. He who invades does so by reason of some superiority; he will then
seek to make the issue as promptly as possible: the defense, on the
contrary, desires delay till his adversary is weakened by sending off
detachments, by marches, and by the privations and fatigues incident to
his progress.

An army is reduced to the defensive only by reverses or by a positive
inferiority. It then seeks in the support of forts, and in natural or
artificial barriers, the means of restoring equality by multiplying
obstacles in the way of the enemy. This plan, when not carried to an
extreme, promises many chances of success, but only when the general has
the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in
his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary;
he must, on the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly upon
the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of
the enemy. This plan of war may be called the defensive-offensive, and
may have strategical as well as tactical advantages.. It combines the
advantages of both systems; for one who awaits his adversary upon a
prepared field, with all his own resources in hand, surrounded by all
the advantages of being on his own ground, can with hope of success take
the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike.

During the first three campaigns of the Seven Years' War Frederick was
the assailant; in the remaining four his conduct was a perfect model of
the defensive-offensive. He was, however, wonderfully aided in this by
his adversaries, who allowed him all the time he desired, and many
opportunities of taking the offensive with success. Wellington's course
was mainly the same in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and it was the most
suitable in his circumstances. It seems plain that one of the greatest
talents of a general is to know how to use (it may be alternately) these
two systems, and particularly to be able to take the initiative during
the progress of a defensive war.




ARTICLE XVII.

Of the Theater of Operations.


The theater of a war comprises all the territory upon which the parties
may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or
to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest.
When the war is also maritime, the theater may embrace both
hemispheres,--as has happened in contests between France and England
since the time of Louis XIV. The theater of a war may thus be undefined,
and must, not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the
other army. The theater of a continental war between France and Austria
may be confined to Italy, or may, in addition, comprise Germany if the
German States take part therein.

Armies may act in concert or separately: in the first case the whole
theater of operations may be considered as a single field upon which
strategy directs the armies for the attainment of a definite end. In the
second case each army will have its own independent theater of
operations. The _theater of operations_ of an army embraces all the
territory it may desire to invade and all that it may be necessary to
defend. If the army operates independently, it should not attempt any
maneuver beyond its own theater, (though it should leave it if it be in
danger of being surrounded,) since the supposition is that no concert of
action has been arranged with the armies operating on the other fields.
If, on the contrary, there be concert of action, the theater of
operations of each army taken singly is but a zone of operations of the
general field, occupied by the masses for the attainment of a common
object.

Independently of its topographical features, each theater upon which one
or more armies operate is composed, for both parties, as follows:--

1. Of a fixed base of operations.

2. Of a principal objective point.

3. Of fronts of operations, strategic fronts, and lines of defense.

4. Of zones and lines of operations.

5. Of temporary strategic lines and lines of communications.

6. Of natural or artificial obstacles to be overcome or to oppose to the
enemy.

7. Of geographical strategic points, whose occupation is important,
either for the offensive or defensive.

8. Of accidental intermediate bases of operations between the objective
point and the primary base.

9. Of points of refuge in case of reverse.

For illustration, let us suppose the case of France invading Austria
with two or three armies, to be concentrated under one commander, and
starting from Mayence, from the Upper Rhine, from Savoy or the Maritime
Alps, respectively. The section of country which each of these armies
traverses may be considered as a zone of the general field of
operations. But if the army of Italy goes but to the Adige without
concerted action with the army of the Rhine, then what was before but a
zone becomes for that army a theater of operations.

In every case, each theater must have its own base, its own objective
point, its zones and lines of operations connecting the objective point
with the base, either in the offensive or the defensive.

It has been taught and published that rivers are lines of operations
_par excellence._ Now, as such a line must possess two or three roads to
move the army within the range of its operations, and at least one line
of retreat, rivers have been called lines of retreat, and even lines of
maneuver. It would be much more accurate to say that rivers are
excellent lines of supply, and powerful auxiliaries in the establishment
of a good line of operations, but never the line itself.

It has also been maintained that, could one create a country expressly
to be a good theater of war, converging roads would be avoided, because
they facilitate invasion. Every country has its capital, its rich cities
for manufactures or trade; and, in the very nature of things, these
points must be the centers of converging routes. Could Germany be made a
desert, to be molded into a theater of war at the pleasure of an
individual, commercial cities and centers of trade would spring up, and
the roads would again necessarily converge to these points. Moreover,
was not the Archduke Charles enabled to beat Jourdan in 1796 by the use
of converging routes? Besides, these routes are more favorable for
defense than attack, since two divisions retreating upon these radial
lines can effect a junction more quickly than two armies which are
pursuing, and they may thus united defeat each of the pursuing masses
separately.

Some authors have affirmed that mountainous countries abound in
strategic positions; others have maintained that, on the contrary,
these points are more rare among the Alps than in the plains, but also
that if more rare they are more important and more decisive.

Some authors have represented that high ranges of mountains are, in war,
inaccessible barriers. Napoleon, on the contrary, in speaking of the
Rhetian Alps, said that "an army could pass wherever a man could put his
foot."

Generals no less experienced than himself in mountain-warfare have
united with him in this opinion, in admitting the great difficulty of
carrying on a defensive war in such localities unless the advantages of
partisan and regular warfare can be combined, the first to guard the
heights and to harass the enemy, the second to give battle at the
decisive points,--the junctions of the large valleys.

These differences of opinion are here noticed merely to show the reader
that, so far from the art having reached perfection, there are many
points that admit of discussion.

The most important topographical or artificial features which make up
the theater of a war will, in succeeding portions of this chapter, be
examined as to their strategic value; but here it may be proper to
remark that this value will depend much upon the spirit and skill of the
general. The great leader who crossed the Saint-Bernard and ordered the
passage of the Splugen was far from believing in the impregnability of
these chains; but he was also far from thinking that a muddy rivulet and
a walled inclosure could change his destiny at Waterloo.




ARTICLE XVIII.

Bases of Operations.


A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army
obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it
takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which
it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively.

The base of operations is most generally that of supply,--though not
necessarily so, at least as far as food is concerned; as, for instance,
a French army upon the Elbe might be subsisted from Westphalia or
Franconia, but its real base would certainly be upon the Rhine.

When a frontier possesses good natural or artificial barriers, it may be
alternately either an excellent base for offensive operations, or a line
of defense when the state is invaded. In the latter case it will always
be prudent to have a second base in rear; for, although an army in its
own country will everywhere find a point of support, there is still a
vast difference between those parts of the country without military
positions and means, as forts, arsenals, and fortified depots, and those
other portions where these military resources are found; and these
latter alone can be considered as safe bases of operations. An army may
have in succession a number of bases: for instance, a French army in
Germany will have the Rhine for its first base; it may have others
beyond this, wherever it has allies or permanent lines of defense; but
if it is driven back across the Rhine it will have for a base either the
Meuse or the Moselle: it might have a third upon the Seine, and a fourth
upon the Loire.

These successive bases may not be entirely or nearly parallel to the
first. On the contrary, a total change of direction may become
necessary. A French army repulsed beyond the Rhine might find a good
base on Befort or Besancon, on Mezieres or Sedan, as the Russian army
after the evacuation of Moscow left the base on the north and east and
established itself upon the line of the Oka and the southern provinces.
These lateral bases perpendicular to the front of defense are often
decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the
country, or at least in rendering it impossible for him to maintain
himself there. A base upon a broad and rapid river, both banks being
held by strong works, would be as favorable as could be desired.

The more extended the base, the more difficulty will there be in
covering it; but it will also be more difficult to cut the army off from
it. A state whose capital is too near the frontier cannot have so
favorable a base in a defensive war as one whose capital is more
retired.

A base, to be perfect, should have two or three fortified points of
sufficient capacity for the establishment of depots of supply. There
should be a _tete de pont_ upon each of its unfordable streams.

All are now agreed upon these principles; but upon other points opinions
have varied. Some have asserted that a perfect base is one parallel to
that of the enemy. My opinion is that bases perpendicular to those of
the enemy are more advantageous, particularly such as have two sides
almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus
affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of
two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely
apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an
unforeseen turn of affairs may necessitate.

The quotations which follow are from my treatise on Great Military
Operations:--

"The general configuration of the theater of war may also have a
great influence upon the direction of the lines of operations, and,
consequently, upon the direction of the bases.

[Illustration: Fig. 1.]

"If every theater of war forms a figure presenting four faces more
or less regular, one of the armies, at the opening of the campaign,
may hold one of these faces,--perhaps two,--while the enemy
occupies the other, the fourth being closed by insurmountable
obstacles. The different ways of occupying this theater will lead
to widely different combinations. To illustrate, we will cite the
theater of the French armies in Westphalia from 1757 to 1762, and
that of Napoleon in 1806, both of which are represented in Fig. 1,
p. 79. In the first case, the side A B was the North Sea, B D the
line of the Weser and the base of Duke Ferdinand, C D the line of
the Main and the base of the French army, A C the line of the
Rhine, also guarded by French troops. The French held two faces,
the North Sea being the third; and hence it was only necessary for
them, by maneuvers, to gain the side B D to be masters of the four
faces, including the base and the communications of the enemy. The
French army, starting from its base C D and gaining the front of
operations F G H, could cut off the allied army I from its base B
D; the latter would be thrown upon the angle A, formed by the lines
of the Rhine, the Ems, and the sea, while the army E could
communicate with its bases on the Main and Rhine.

"The movement of Napoleon in 1806 on the Saale was similar. He
occupied at Jena and Naumburg the line F G H, then marched by Halle
and Dessau to force the Prussian army I upon the sea, represented
by the side A B. The result is well known.

"The art, then, of selecting lines of operations is to give them
such directions as to seize the communications of the enemy without
losing one's own. The line F G H, by its extended position, and the
bend on the flank of the enemy, always protects the communications
with the base C D; and this is exactly the maneuvers of Marengo,
Ulm, and Jena.

"When the theater of war does not border upon the sea, it is always
bounded by a powerful neutral state, which guards its frontiers and
closes one side of the square. This may not be an obstacle
insurmountable like the sea; but generally it may be considered as
an obstacle upon which it would be dangerous to retreat after a
defeat: hence it would be an advantage to force the enemy upon it.
The soil of a power which can bring into the field one hundred and
fifty or two hundred thousand troops cannot be violated with
impunity; and if a defeated army made the attempt, it would be none
the less cut off from its base. If the boundary of the theater of
war should be the territory of a weak state, it would be absorbed
in this theater, and the square would be enlarged till it reached
the frontiers of a powerful state, or the sea. The outline of the
frontiers may modify the shape of the quadrilateral so as to make
it approach the figure of a parallelogram or trapezoid, as in
Figure 2. In either case, the advantage of the army which has
control of two faces of the figure, and possesses the power of
establishing upon them a double base, will be still more decided,
since it will be able more easily to cut the enemy off from the
shortened side,--as was the case with the Prussian army in 1806,
with the side B D J of the parallelogram formed by the lines of the
Rhine, the Oder, the North Sea, and the mountainous frontier of
Franconia."

[Illustration: Fig. 2.]

The selection of Bohemia as a base in 1813 goes to prove the truth of my
opinion; for it was the perpendicularity of this base to that of the
French army which enabled the allies to neutralize the immense
advantages which the line of the Elbe would otherwise have afforded
Napoleon, and turned the advantages of the campaign in their favor.
Likewise, in 1812, by establishing their base perpendicularly upon the
Oka and Kalouga, the Russians were able to execute their flank march
upon Wiazma and Krasnoi.

If any thing further be required to establish these truths, it will only
be necessary to consider that, if the base be perpendicular to that of
the enemy, the front of operations will be parallel to his line of
operations, and that hence it will be easy to attack his communications
and line of retreat.

It has been stated that perpendicular bases are particularly favorable
in the case of a double frontier, as in the last figures. Critics may
object to this that it does not agree with what is elsewhere said in
favor of frontiers which are salient toward the enemy, and against
double lines of operations with equality of force. (Art. XXI.) The
objection is not well founded; for the greatest advantage of a
perpendicular base consists in the fact that it forms such a salient,
which takes in reverse a portion of the theater of operations. On the
other hand, a base with two faces by no means requires that both should
be occupied in force: on the contrary, upon one of them it will be
sufficient to have some fortified points garrisoned by small bodies,
while the great bulk of the force rests upon the other face,--as was
done in the campaigns of 1800 and 1806. The angle of nearly ninety
degrees formed by the portion of the Rhine from Constance to Basel, and
thence to Kehl, gave General Moreau one base parallel and another
perpendicular to that of his antagonist. He threw two divisions by his
left toward Kehl on the first base, to attract the attention of the
enemy to that point, while he moved with nine divisions upon the
extremity of the perpendicular face toward Schaffhausen, which carried
him in a few days to the gates of Augsburg, the two detached divisions
having already rejoined him.

In 1806, Napoleon had also the double base of the Rhine and Main,
forming almost a right re-entrant angle. He left Mortier upon the first
and parallel one, while with the mass of his forces he gained the
extremity of the perpendicular base, and thus intercepted the Prussians
at Gera and Naumburg by reaching their line of retreat.

If so many imposing facts prove that bases with two faces, one of them
being almost perpendicular to that of the enemy, are the best, it is
well to recollect that, in default of such a base, its advantages may be
partially supplied by a change of strategic front, as will be seen in
Article XX.

Another very important point in reference to the proper direction of
bases relates to those established on the sea-coast. These bases may be
favorable in some circumstances, but are equally unfavorable in others,
as may be readily seen from what precedes. The danger which must always
exist of an army being driven to the sea seems so clear, in the ease of
the establishment of the base upon it, (which bases can only be
favorable to naval powers,) that it is astonishing to hear in our day
praises of such a base. Wellington, coming with a fleet to the relief of
Spain and Portugal, could not have secured a better base than that of
Lisbon, or rather of the peninsula of Torres-Vedras, which covers all
the avenues to that capital on the land side. The sea and the Tagus not
only protected both flanks, but secured the safety of his only possible
line of retreat, which was upon the fleet.

Blinded by the advantages which the intrenched camp of Torres-Vedras
secured for the English, and not tracing effects to their real causes,
many generals in other respects wise contend that no bases are good
except such as rest on the sea and thus afford the army facilities of
supply and refuge with both flanks secured. Fascinated by similar
notions, Colonel Carion-Nizas asserted that in 1813 Napoleon ought to
have posted half of his army in Bohemia and thrown one hundred and fifty
thousand men on the mouths of the Elbe toward Hamburg; forgetting that
the first precept for a continental army is to establish its base upon
the front farthest _from_ the sea, so as to secure the benefit of all
its elements of strength, from which it might find itself cut off if the
base were established upon the coast.

An insular and naval power acting on the continent would pursue a
diametrically opposite course, but resulting from the same principle,
viz.: _to establish the base upon those points where it can be sustained
by all the resources of the country, and at the same time insure a safe
retreat._

A state powerful both on land and sea, whose squadrons control the sea
adjacent to the theater of operations, might well base an army of forty
or fifty thousand men upon the coast, as its retreat by sea and its
supplies could be well assured; but to establish a continental army of
one hundred and fifty thousand men upon such a base, when opposed by a
disciplined and nearly equal force, would be an act of madness.

However, as every maxim has its exceptions, there is a case in which it
may be admissible to base a continental army upon the sea: it is, when
your adversary is not formidable upon land, and when you, being master
of the sea, can supply the army with more facility than in the interior.
We rarely see these conditions fulfilled: it was so, however, during the
Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. The whole attention of the Russians was
given to Varna and Bourghas, while Shumla was merely observed; a plan
which they could not have pursued in the presence of a European army
(even with the control of the sea) without great danger of ruin.