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The Art of War written by Baron Henri de Jomini

B >> Baron Henri de Jomini >> The Art of War




1st. To give the command to a man of tried bravery, bold in the fight,
and of unshaken firmness in danger.

2d. To assign, as his chief of staff, a man of high ability, of open and
faithful character, between whom and the commander there may be perfect
harmony. The victor will gain so much glory that he can spare some to
the friend who has contributed to his success. In this way Bluecher,
aided by Gneisenau and Muffling, gained glory which probably he would
not have been able to do of himself. It is true that this double command
is more objectionable than an undivided one when a state has a Napoleon,
a Frederick, or a Suwaroff to fill it; but when there is no great
general to lead the armies it is certainly the preferable system.

Before leaving this important branch of the subject, another means of
influencing military operations--viz.: that of a council of war at the
seat of government--deserves notice. Louvois for a long time directed
from Paris the armies of Louis XIV., and with success. Carnot, also,
from Paris directed the armies of the Republic: in 1793 he did well, and
saved France; in 1794 his action was at first very unfortunate, but he
repaired his faults afterward by chance; in 1796 he was completely at
fault. It is to be observed, however, that both Louvois and Carnot
individually controlled the armies, and that there was no council of
war. The Aulic council, sitting in Vienna, was often intrusted with the
duty of directing the operations of the armies; and there has never been
but one opinion in Europe as to its fatal influence. Whether this
opinion is right or wrong, the Austrian generals alone are able to
decide. My own opinion is that the functions of such a body in this
connection should be limited to the adoption of a general plan of
operations. By this I do not mean a plan which should trace out the
campaign in detail, restricting the generals and compelling them to give
battle without regard to circumstances, but a plan which should
determine the object of the campaign, the nature of the operations,
whether offensive or defensive, the material means to be applied to
these first enterprises, afterward for the reserves, and finally for the
levies which may be necessary if the country be invaded. These points,
it is true, should be discussed in a council of both generals and
ministers, and to these points should the control of the council be
limited; for if it should not only order the general in command to march
to Vienna or to Paris, but should also have the presumption to indicate
the manner in which he should maneuver to attain this object, the
unfortunate general would certainly be beaten, and the whole
responsibility of his reverses should fall upon the shoulders of those
who, hundreds of miles distant, took upon themselves the duty of
directing the army,--a duty so difficult for any one, even upon the
scene of operations.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 4: General Ruchel thought at the battle of Jena that he could
save the army by giving the command to advance the right shoulder in
order to form an oblique line.]




ARTICLE XV.

The Military Spirit of Nations, and the Morale of Armies.


The adoption of the best regulations for the organization of an army
would be in vain if the government did not at the same time cultivate a
military spirit in its citizens. It may well be the case in London,
situated on an island and protected from invasion by its immense fleets,
that the title of a rich banker should be preferred to a military
decoration; but a continental nation imbued with the sentiments and
habits of the tradesmen of London or the bankers of Paris would sooner
or later fall a prey to its neighbors. It was to the union of the civic
virtues and military spirit fostered by their institutions that the
Romans were indebted for their grandeur; and when they lost these
virtues, and when, no longer regarding the military service as an honor
as well as a duty, they relinquished it to mercenary Goths and Gauls,
the fall of the empire became inevitable. It is doubtless true that
whatever increases the prosperity of the country should be neither
neglected nor despised; it is also necessary to honor the branches of
industry which are the first instruments of this prosperity; but they
should always be secondary to the great institutions which make up the
strength of states in encouraging the cultivation of the manly and
heroic virtues. Policy and justice both agree on this point; for,
whatever Boileau may say, it is certainly more glorious to confront
death in the footsteps of the Caesars than to fatten upon the public
miseries by gambling on the vicissitudes of the national credit.
Misfortune will certainly fall upon the land where the wealth of the
tax-gatherer or the greedy gambler in stocks stands, in public
estimation, above the uniform of the brave man who sacrifices his life,
health, or fortune to the defense of his country.

The first means of encouraging the military spirit is to invest the army
with all possible social and public consideration. The second means is
to give the preference to those who have rendered services to the state,
in filling any vacancies in the administrative departments of the
government, or even to require a certain length of military service as a
qualification for certain offices. A comparison of the ancient military
institutions of Rome with those of Russia and Prussia, is a subject
worthy of serious attention; and it would also be interesting to
contrast them with the doctrines of modern theorists, who declare
against the employment of officers of the army in other public
functions, and who wish for none but rhetoricians in the important
offices of administration.[5] It is true that many public employments
demand a special course of study; but cannot the soldier, in the
abundant leisure of peace, prepare himself for the career he would
prefer after having fulfilled his debt to his country in the profession
of arms? If these administrative offices were conferred upon officers
retired from the army in a grade not lower than that of captain, would
it not be a stimulant for officers to attain that rank, and would it not
lead them, when in garrisons, to find their recreations elsewhere than
in the theaters and public clubs?

It may be possible that this facility of transfer from the military to
the civil service would be rather injurious than favorable to a high
military spirit, and that to encourage this spirit it would be expedient
to place the profession of the soldier above all others. This was the
early practice of the Mamelukes and Janissaries. Their soldiers were
bought at the age of about seven years, and were educated in the idea
that they were to die by their standards. Even the English--so jealous
of their rights--contract, in enlisting as soldiers, the obligation for
the whole length of their lives, and the Russian, in enlisting for
twenty-five years, does what is almost equivalent. In such armies, and
in those recruited by voluntary enlistments, perhaps it would not be
advisable to tolerate this fusion of military and civil offices; but
where the military service is a temporary duty imposed upon the people,
the case is different, and the old Roman laws which required a previous
military service of ten years in any aspirant for the public
employments, seem to be best calculated to preserve the military
spirit,--particularly in this age, when the attainment of material
comfort and prosperity appears to be the dominant passion of the people.

However this may be, still, in my opinion, under all forms of
government, it will be a wise part to honor the military profession, in
order to encourage the love of glory and all the warlike virtues, under
the penalty of receiving the reproaches of posterity and suffering
insult and dependency.

It is not sufficient to foster the military spirit among the people,
but, more than that, it is necessary to encourage it in the army. Of
what avail would it be if the uniform be honored in the land and it be
regarded as a duty to serve in the army, while the military virtues are
wanting? The forces would be numerous but without valor.

The enthusiasm of an army and its military spirit are two quite
different things, and should not be confounded, although they produce
the same effects. The first is the effect of passions more or less of a
temporary character,--of a political or religious nature, for instance,
or of a great love of country; while the latter, depending upon the
skill of the commander and resulting from military institutions, is
more permanent and depends less upon circumstances, and should be the
object of the attention of every far-seeing government.[6] Courage
should be recompensed and honored, the different grades in rank
respected, and discipline should exist in the sentiments and convictions
rather than in external forms only.

The officers should feel the conviction that resignation, bravery, and
faithful attention to duty are virtues without which no glory is
possible, no army is respectable, and that firmness amid reverses is
more honorable than enthusiasm in success,--since courage alone is
necessary to storm a position, while it requires heroism to make a
difficult retreat before a victorious and enterprising enemy, always
opposing to him a firm and unbroken front. A fine retreat should meet
with a reward equal to that given for a great victory.

By inuring armies to labor and fatigue, by keeping them from stagnation
in garrison in times of peace, by inculcating their superiority over
their enemies, without depreciating too much the latter, by inspiring a
love for great exploits,--in a word, by exciting their enthusiasm by
every means in harmony with their tone of mind, by honoring courage,
punishing weakness, and disgracing cowardice,--we may expect to maintain
a high military spirit.

Effeminacy was the chief cause of the ruin of the Roman legions: those
formidable soldiers, who had borne the casque, buckler, and cuirass in
the times of the Scipios under the burning sun of Africa, found them too
heavy in the cool climates of Germany and Gaul; and then the empire was
lost.

I have remarked that it is not well to create a too great contempt for
the enemy, lest the _morale_ of the soldier should be shaken if he
encounter an obstinate resistance. Napoleon at Jena, addressing Lannes'
troops, praised the Prussian cavalry, but promised that they would
contend in vain against the bayonets of his Egyptians.

The officers and troops must be warned against those sudden panics
which often seize the bravest armies when they are not well controlled
by discipline, and hence when they do not recognize that in order is the
surest hope of safety. It was not from want of courage that one hundred
thousand Turks were beaten at Peterwardein by Prince Eugene, and at
Kagoul by Romanzoff: it was because, once repulsed in their disorderly
charges, every one yielded to his personal feelings, and because they
fought individually, but not in masses and in order. An army seized with
panic is similarly in a state of demoralization; because when disorder
is once introduced all concerted action on the part of individuals
becomes impossible, the voice of the officers can no longer be heard, no
maneuver for resuming the battle can be executed, and there is no
resource but in ignominious flight.

Nations with powerful imaginations are particularly liable to panics;
and nothing short of strong institutions and skillful leaders can remedy
it. Even the French, whose military virtues when well led have never
been questioned, have often performed some quick movements of this kind
which were highly ridiculous. We may refer to the unbecoming panic which
pervaded the infantry of Marshal Villars after having gained the battle
of Friedlingen, in 1704. The same occurred to Napoleon's infantry after
the victory of Wagram and when the enemy was in full retreat. A still
more extraordinary case was the flight of the 97th semi-brigade, fifteen
hundred strong, at the siege of Genoa, before a platoon of cavalry. Two
days afterward these same men took Fort Diamond by one of the most
vigorous assaults mentioned in modern history.

Still, it would seem to be easy to convince brave men that death comes
more quickly and more surely to those who fly in disorder than to those
who remain together and present a firm front to the enemy, or who rally
promptly when their lines have been for the instant broken.

In this respect the Russian army may be taken as a model by all others.
The firmness which it has displayed in all retreats is due in equal
degrees to the national character, the natural instincts of the
soldiers, and the excellent disciplinary institutions. Indeed, vivacity
of imagination is not always the cause of the introduction of disorder:
the want of the habit of order often causes it, and the lack of
precautions on the part of the generals to maintain this order
contributes to it. I have often been astonished at the indifference of
most generals on this point. Not only did they not deign to take the
slightest precaution to give the proper direction to small detachments
or scattered men, and fail to adopt any signals to facilitate the
rallying in each division of the fractions which may be scattered in a
momentary panic or in an irresistible charge of the enemy, but they were
offended that any one should think of proposing such precautions. Still,
the most undoubted courage and the most severe discipline will often be
powerless to remedy a great disorder, which might be in a great degree
obviated by the use of rallying-signals for the different divisions.
There are, it is true, cases where all human resources are insufficient
for the maintenance of order, as when the physical sufferings of the
soldiers have been so great as to render them deaf to all appeals, and
when their officers find it impossible to do any thing to organize
them,--which was the case in the retreat of 1812. Leaving out these
exceptional cases, good habits of order, good logistical precautions for
rallying, and good discipline will most frequently be successful, if not
in preventing disorder, at least in promptly remedying it.

It is now time to leave this branch, of which I have only desired to
trace an outline, and to proceed to the examination of subjects which
are purely military.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 5: For instance, in France, instead of excluding all officers
from the privilege of the elective franchise, it should be given to all
colonels; and the generals should be eligible to the legislature. The
most venal deputies will not be those from military life.]

[Footnote 6: It is particularly important that this spirit should
pervade the officers and non-commissioned officers: if they be capable,
and the nation brave, there need be no fear for the men.]




CHAPTER III.

STRATEGY.

DEFINITION OF STRATEGY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.


The art of war, independently of its political and moral relations,
consists of five principal parts, viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics,
Logistics, Tactics of the different arms, and the Art of the Engineer.
We will treat of the first three branches, and begin by defining them.
In order to do this, we will follow the order of procedure of a general
when war is first declared, who commences with the points of the highest
importance, as a plan of campaign, and afterward descends to the
necessary details. Tactics, on the contrary, begins with details, and
ascends to combinations and generalization necessary for the formation
and handling of a great army.

We will suppose an army taking the field: the first care of its
commander should be to agree with the head of the state upon the
character of the war: then he must carefully study the theater of war,
and select the most suitable base of operations, taking into
consideration the frontiers of the state and those of its allies.

The selection of this base and the proposed aim will determine the zone
of operations. The general will take a first objective point: he will
select the line of operations leading to this point, either as a
temporary or permanent line, giving it the most advantageous direction;
namely, that which promises the greatest number of favorable
opportunities with the least danger. An army marching on this line of
operations will have a front of operations and a strategic front. The
temporary positions which the corps d'armee will occupy upon this front
of operations, or upon the line of defense, will be strategic positions.

When near its first objective point, and when it begins to meet
resistance, the army will either attack the enemy or maneuver to compel
him to retreat; and for this end it will adopt one or two strategic
lines of maneuvers, which, being temporary, may deviate to a certain
degree from the general line of operations, with which they must not be
confounded.

To connect the strategic front with the base as the advance is made,
lines of supply, depots, &c. will be established.

If the line of operations be long, and there be hostile troops in
annoying proximity to it, these bodies may either be attacked and
dispersed or be merely observed, or the operations against the enemy may
be carried on without reference to them. If the second of these courses
be pursued, a double strategic front and large detachments will be the
result.

The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the
enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will
be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective
point or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective
point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be
commenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after
detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a
strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which,
less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria,
leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty
thousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul.

If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if
it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more
important objective point.

If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an
intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already
occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small
strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and
also the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses large
streams, it will construct _tetes de pont_; and, if the bridges are
within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the
means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the
strategic reserve which may occupy these posts.

Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in
order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is
equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts
and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces.

When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the
field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and
is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter
campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not
differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased
activity and energy to attain prompt success.

Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it,
while discussing combinations which result from these operations.

Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:--

1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the
different combinations of which it admits.

2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and
the most favorable direction for operations.

3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of
operations.

4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.

5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.

6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or
strategic front.

7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different
maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.

8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.

9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.

10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the
army.

11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army,
as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.

12. Points for intrenched camps, _tetes de pont,_ &c.

13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.

These points are principally of importance in the determination of the
first steps of a campaign; but there are other operations of a mixed
nature, such as passages of streams, retreats, surprises,
disembarkations, convoys, winter quarters, the execution of which
belongs to tactics, the conception and arrangement to strategy.

The maneuvering of an army upon the battle-field, and the different
formations of troops for attack, constitute Grand Tactics. Logistics is
the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches
and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the
execution of strategical and tactical enterprises.

To repeat. Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and
comprehends the whole theater of operations. Grand Tactics is the art of
posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the
ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the
ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may
extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics
comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of
strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings
the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution
and the employment of the troops.

It is true that many battles have been decided by strategic movements,
and have been, indeed, but a succession of them; but this only occurs in
the exceptional case of a dispersed army: for the general case of
pitched battles the above definition holds good.

Grand Tactics, in addition to acts of local execution, relates to the
following objects:--

1. The choice of positions and defensive lines of battle.

2. The offensive in a defensive battle.

3. The different orders of battle, or the grand maneuvers proper for the
attack of the enemy's line.

4. The collision of two armies on the march, or unexpected battles.

5. Surprises of armies in the open field.

6. The arrangements for leading troops into battle.

7. The attack of positions and intrenched camps.

8. _Coups de main_.

All other operations, such as relate to convoys, foraging-parties,
skirmishes of advanced or rear guards, the attack of small posts, and
any thing accomplished by a detachment or single division, may be
regarded as details of war, and not included in the great operations.


THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.

It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all
the operations of war,--a principle which must be followed in all good
combinations. It is embraced in the following maxims:--

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively,
upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the
communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising
one's own.

2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of
one's forces.

3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the
decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of
the first importance to overthrow.

4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the
decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with
energy.

This principle has too much simplicity to escape criticism: one
objection is that it is easy to recommend throwing the mass of the
forces upon the decisive points, but that the difficulty lies in
recognizing those points.

This truth is evident; and it would be little short of the ridiculous to
enunciate such a general principle without accompanying it with all
necessary explanations for its application upon the field. In Article
XIX. these decisive points will be described, and in Articles from
XVIII. to XXII. will be discussed their relations to the different
combinations. Those students who, having attentively considered what is
there stated, still regard the determination of these points as a
problem without a solution, may well despair of ever comprehending
strategy.

The general theater of operations seldom contains more than three
zones,--the right, the left, and the center; and each zone, front of
operations, strategic position, and line of defense, as well as each
line of battle, has the same subdivisions,--two extremities and the
center. A direction upon one of these three will always be suitable for
the attainment of the desired end. A direction upon one of the two
remaining will be less advantageous; while the third direction will be
wholly inapplicable. In considering the object proposed in connection
with the positions of the enemy and the geography of the country, it
will appear that in every strategic movement or tactical maneuver the
question for decision will always be, whether to maneuver to the right,
to the left, or directly in front. The selection of one of these three
simple alternatives cannot, surely, be considered an enigma. The art of
giving the proper direction to the masses is certainly the basis of
strategy, although it is not the whole of the art of war. Executive
talent, skill, energy, and a quick apprehension of events are necessary
to carry out any combinations previously arranged.