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The Art of War written by Baron Henri de Jomini

B >> Baron Henri de Jomini >> The Art of War




It appears evident, therefore, that the left zone would be the most
disadvantageous for army B, and the right zone would be inconvenient,
although somewhat favorable in a certain point of view. The central zone
remains to be examined. This is found to possess all desirable
advantages, because the army B might move the mass of its force toward
Charleroi with a view of cutting through the immense front of operations
of the enemy, might overwhelm his center, and drive the right back upon
Antwerp and the Lower Scheldt, without seriously exposing its own
communications.

When the forces are chiefly concentrated upon the most favorable zone,
they should, of course, have that direction of movement toward the
enemy's front of operations which is in harmony with the chief object in
view. For example, if you shall have operated by your right against the
enemy's left, with the intention of cutting off the greater portion of
his army from its base of the Rhine, you should certainly continue to
operate in the same direction; for if you should make your greatest
effort against the right of the enemy's front, while your plan was to
gain an advantage over his left, your operations could not result as you
anticipated, no matter how well they might be executed. If, on the
contrary, you had decided to take the left zone, with the intention of
crowding the enemy back upon the sea, you ought constantly to maneuver
by your right in order to accomplish your object; for if you maneuvered
by the left, yourself and not the enemy would be the party thrown back
upon the sea in case of a reverse.

Applying these ideas to the theaters of the campaigns of Marengo, Ulm,
and Jena, we find the same three zones, with this difference, that in
those campaigns the central direction was not the best. In 1800, the
direction of the left led straight to the left bank of the Po, on the
line of retreat of Melas; in 1805, the left zone was the one which led
by the way of Donauwerth to the extreme right, and the line of retreat
of Mack; in 1806, however, Napoleon could reach the Prussian line of
retreat by the right zone, filing off from Bamberg toward Gera.

In 1800, Napoleon had to choose between a line of operations on the
right, leading to the sea-shore toward Nice and Savona, that of the
center, leading by Mont-Cenis toward Turin, and that of the left,
leading to the line of communications of Melas, by way of Saint-Bernard
or the Simplon. The first two directions had nothing in their favor, and
the right might have been very dangerous,--as, in fact, it proved to
Massena, who was forced back to Genoa and there besieged. The decisive
direction was evidently that by the left.

I have said enough to explain my ideas on this point.

The subject of battles is somewhat more complicated; for in the
arrangements for these there are both strategical and tactical
considerations to be taken into account and harmonized. A position for
battle, being necessarily connected with the line of retreat and the
base of operations, must have a well-defined strategic direction; but
this direction must also depend somewhat upon the character of the
ground and the stations of the troops of both parties to the engagement:
these are tactical considerations. Although an army usually takes such a
position for a battle as will keep its line of retreat behind it,
sometimes it is obliged to assume a position parallel to this line. In
such a case it is evident that if you fall with overwhelming force upon
the wing nearest the line of retreat, the enemy may be cut off or
destroyed, or, at least, have no other chance of escape than in forcing
his way through your line.

I will here mention as illustrations the celebrated battle of Leuthen
in 1757, of which I have given an account in the history of Frederick's
wars, and the famous days of Krasnoi, in the retreat from Moscow in
1812.

[Illustration: Fig. 40.]

The annexed figure (40) explains the combination at Krasnoi. The line A
A is Napoleon's line of retreat toward C. He took the position B B to
cover his line. It is evident that the principal mass of Koutousoff's
army D D should have moved to E E in order to fall on the right of the
French, whose army would have been certainly destroyed if it had been
anticipated at C; for everybody knows in what a state it was while thus
fifteen hundred miles from its true base.

There was the same combination at Jemmapes, where Dumouriez, by
outflanking the Austrian left, instead of attacking their right, would
have entirely cut them off from the Rhine.

At the battle of Leuthen Frederick overwhelmed the Austrian left, which
was in the direction of their line of retreat; and for this reason the
right wing was obliged to take refuge in Breslau, where it capitulated a
few days later.

In such cases there is no cause for hesitation. The decisive point is
that wing of the enemy which is nearest his line of retreat, and this
line you must seize while protecting your own.

When an enemy has one or two lines of retreat perpendicular to and
behind his position of battle, it will generally be best to attack the
center, or that wing where the obstacles of the ground shall be the
least favorable for the defense; for in such a case the first
consideration is to gain the battle, without having in view the total
destruction of the enemy. That depends upon the relative numerical
strength, the _morale_ of the two armies, and other circumstances, with
reference to which no fixed rules can be laid down.

Finally, it happens sometimes that an army succeeds in seizing the
enemy's line of retreat before fighting a battle, as Napoleon did at
Marengo, Ulm, and Jena. The decisive point having in such case been
secured by skillful marches before fighting, it only remains to prevent
the enemy from forcing his way through your line. You can do nothing
better than fight a parallel battle, as there is no reason for
maneuvering against one wing more than the other. But for the enemy who
is thus cut off the case is very different. He should certainly strike
most heavily in the direction of that wing where he can hope most
speedily to regain his proper line of retreat; and if he throws the mass
of his forces there, he may save at least a large portion of them. All
that he has to do is to determine whether this decisive effort shall be
toward the right or the left.

It is proper for me to remark that the passage of a great river in the
presence of a hostile army is sometimes an exceptional case to which the
general rules will not apply. In these operations, which are of an
exceedingly delicate character, the essential thing is to keep the
bridges safe. If, after effecting the passage, a general should throw
the mass of his forces toward the right or the left with a view of
taking possession of some decisive point, or of driving his enemy back
upon the river, whilst the latter was collecting all his forces in
another direction to seize the bridges, the former army might be in a
very critical condition in case of a reverse befalling it. The battle of
Wagram is an excellent example in point,--as good, indeed, as could be
desired. I have treated this subject in Article XXXVII., (pages 224 and
following.)

A military man who clearly perceives the importance of the truths that
have been stated will succeed in acquiring a rapid and accurate
_coup-d'oeil_. It will be admitted, moreover, that a general who
estimates them at their true value, and accustoms himself to their use,
either in reading military history, or in hypothetical cases on maps,
will seldom be in doubt, in real campaigns, what he ought to do; and
even when his enemy attempts sudden and unexpected movements, he will
always be ready with suitable measures for counteracting them, by
constantly bearing in mind the few simple fundamental principles which
should regulate all the operations of war.

Heaven forbid that I should pretend to lessen the dignity of the sublime
art of war by reducing it to such simple elements! I appreciate
thoroughly the difference between the directing principles of
combinations arranged in the quiet of the closet, and that special
talent which is indispensable to the individual who has, amidst the
noise and confusion of battle, to keep a hundred thousand men
co-operating toward the attainment of one single object. I know well
what should be the character and talents of the general who has to make
such masses move as one man, to engage them at the proper point
simultaneously and at the proper moment, to keep them supplied with
arms, provisions, clothing, and munitions. Still, although this special
talent, to which I have referred, is indispensable, it must be granted
that the ability to give wise direction to masses upon the best
strategic points of a theater of operations is the most sublime
characteristic of a great captain. How many brave armies, under the
command of leaders who were also brave and possessed executive ability,
have lost not only battles, but even empires, because they were moved
imprudently in one direction when they should have gone in the other!
Numerous examples might be mentioned; but I will refer only to Ligny,
Waterloo, Bautzen, Dennewitz, Leuthen.

I will say no more; for I could only repeat what has already been said.
To relieve myself in advance of the blame which will be ascribed to me
for attaching too much importance to the application of the few maxims
laid down in my writings, I will repeat what I was the first to
announce:--"_that war is not an exact science, but a drama full of
passion_; that the moral qualities, the talents, the executive foresight
and ability, the greatness of character, of the leaders, and the
impulses, sympathies, and passions of the masses, have a great influence
upon it." I may be permitted also, after having written the detailed
history of thirty campaigns and assisted in person in twelve of the most
celebrated of them, to declare that I have not found a single case where
these principles, correctly applied, did not lead to success.

As to the special executive ability and the well-balanced penetrating
mind which distinguish the practical man from the one who knows only
what others teach him, I confess that no book can introduce those things
into a head where the germ does not previously exist by nature. I have
seen many generals--marshals, even--attain a certain degree of
reputation by talking largely of principles which they conceived
incorrectly in theory and could not apply at all. I have seen these men
intrusted with the supreme command of armies, and make the most
extravagant plans, because they were totally deficient in good judgment
and were filled with inordinate self-conceit. My works are not intended
for such misguided persons as these, but my desire has been to
facilitate the study of the art of war for careful, inquiring minds, by
pointing out directing principles. Taking this view, I claim credit for
having rendered valuable service to those officers who are really
desirous of gaining distinction in the profession of arms.

Finally, I will conclude this short summary with one last truth:--

"The first of all the requisites for a man's success as a leader is,
that he be perfectly brave. When a general is animated by a truly
martial spirit and can communicate it to his soldiers, he may commit
faults, but he will gain victories and secure deserved laurels."

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SECOND APPENDIX

TO THE

SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.

ON THE FORMATION OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.


Happening to be in Paris, near the end of 1851, a distinguished person
did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in
fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making
war.

I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of
tactics, but that, in great strategic operations and the grand
combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the
application of the principles which had led to the success of great
generals in all ages,--of Alexander and Caesar as well as of Frederick
and Napoleon. My illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of my
opinion.

The heroic events which have recently occurred near Sebastopol have not
produced the slightest change in my opinion. This gigantic contest
between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and
mounting two thousand guns of the largest caliber, is an event without
precedent, which will have no equal in the future; for the circumstances
which produced it cannot occur again.

Moreover, this contest of cannon with ramparts, bearing no resemblance
to regular pitched battles fought in the center of a continent, cannot
influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the
tactics of battles.

The bloody battles of the Alma and Inkermann, by giving evidence of the
murderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led me to investigate
the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account in the
tactics for infantry.

I shall endeavor to fulfill this task in a few words, in order to
complete what was published on this point twenty years ago in the
Summary of the Art of War.

The important question of the influence of musketry-fire in battles is
not new: it dates from the reign of Frederick the Great, and
particularly from the battle of Mollwitz, which he gained (it was said)
because his infantry-soldiers, by the use of cylindrical rammers in
loading their muskets, were able to fire three shots per minute more
than their enemies.[55] The discussion which arose at this epoch between
the partisans of the shallow and deep orders of formation for troops is
known to all military students.

The system of deployed lines in three ranks was adopted for the
infantry; the cavalry, formed in two ranks, and in the order of battle,
was deployed upon the wings, or a part was held in reserve.

The celebrated regulation for maneuvers of 1791 fixed the deployed as
the only order for battle: it seemed to admit the use of
battalion-columns doubled on the center only in partial combats,--such
as an attack upon an isolated post, a village, a forest, or small
intrenchments.[56]


The insufficient instruction in maneuvers of the troops of the Republic
forced the generals, who were poor tacticians, to employ in battle the
system of columns supported by numerous skirmishers. Besides this, the
nature of the countries which formed the theaters of operations--the
Vosges, Alps, Pyrenees, and the difficult country of La Vendee--rendered
this the only appropriate system. How would it have been possible to
attack the camps of Saorgio, Figueras, and Mont-Cenis with deployed
regiments?

In Napoleon's time, the French generally used the system of columns, as
they were nearly always the assailants.

In 1807, I published, at Glogau in Silesia, a small pamphlet with the
title of "Summary of the General Principles of the Art of War," in which
I proposed to admit for the attack the system of lines formed of columns
of battalions by divisions of two companies; in other words, to march to
the attack in lines of battalions closed in mass or at half-distance,
preceded by numerous skirmishers, and the columns being separated by
intervals that may vary between that necessary for the deployment of a
battalion and the minimum of the front of one column.

What I had recently seen in the campaigns of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and
Eylau had convinced me of the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of
marching an army in deployed lines in either two or three ranks, to
attack an enemy in position. It was this conviction which led me to
publish the pamphlet above referred to. This work attracted some
attention, not only on account of the treatise on strategy, but also on
account of what was said on tactics.

The successes gained by Wellington in Spain and at Waterloo with troops
deployed in lines of two ranks were generally attributed to the
murderous effect of the infantry-fire, and created doubt in some minds
as to the propriety of the use of small columns; but it was not till
after 1815 that the controversies on the best formation for battle wore
renewed by the appearance of a pamphlet by the Marquis of Chambray.

In these discussions, I remarked the fatal tendency of the clearest
minds to reduce every system of war to absolute forms, and to cast in
the same mold all the tactical combinations a general may arrange,
without taking into consideration localities, moral circumstances,
national characteristics, or the abilities of the commanders. I had
proposed to use lines of small columns, especially in the attack: I
never intended to make it an exclusive system, particularly for the
defense.

I had two opportunities of being convinced that this formation was
approved of by the greatest generals of our times. The first was at the
Congress of Vienna, in the latter part of 1814: the Archduke Charles
observed "that he was under great obligations for the summary I had
published in 1807, which General Walmoden had brought to him in 1808
from Silesia." At the beginning of the war of 1809, the prince had not
thought it possible to apply the formation which I had proposed; but at
the battle of Essling the contracted space of the field induced him to
form a part of his army in columns by battalions, (the landwehr
particularly,) and they resisted admirably the furious charges of the
cuirassiers of General d'Espagne, which, in the opinion of the archduke,
they could not have done if they had been deployed.

At the battle of Wagram, the greater part of the Austrian line was
formed in the same way as at Essling, and after two days of terrible
fighting the archduke abandoned the field of battle, not because his
army was badly beaten, but because his left was outflanked and thrown
back so as to endanger his line of retreat on Hungary. The prince was
satisfied that the firm bearing of his troops was in part due to this
mixture of small columns with deployed battalions.

The second witness is Wellington; although his evidence is, apparently,
not so conclusive. Having been presented to him at the Congress of
Verona in 1823, I had occasion to speak to him on the subject of the
controversies to which his system of formation for battle (a system to
which a great part of his success had been attributed) had given rise.
He remarked that he was convinced the manner of the attack of the French
upon him, in columns more or less deep, was very dangerous against a
solid, well-armed infantry having confidence in its fire and well
supported by artillery and cavalry. I observed to the duke that these
deep columns were very different from the small columns which I
proposed,--a formation which insures in the attack steadiness, force,
and mobility, while deep masses afford no greater mobility and force
than a deployed line, and are very much more exposed to the ravages of
artillery.

I asked the illustrious general if at Waterloo he had not formed the
Hanoverian, Brunswick, and Belgian troops in columns by battalions. He
answered, "Yes; because I could not depend upon them so well as upon the
English." I replied that this admission proved that he thought a line
formed of columns by battalions was more firm than long deployed lines.
He replied, "They are certainly good, also; but their use always depends
upon the localities and the spirit of the troops. A general cannot act
in the same manner under all circumstances."

To this illustrious evidence I might add that Napoleon himself, in the
campaign of 1813, prescribed for the attack the formation of the
infantry in columns by divisions of two companies in two ranks, as the
most suitable,--which was identically what I had proposed in 1807.

The Duke of Wellington also admitted that the French columns at
Waterloo, particularly those of their right wing, were not small columns
of battalions, but enormous masses, much more unwieldy and much deeper.

If we can believe the Prussian accounts and plans of the battle, it
would seem that Ney's four divisions were formed in but four columns, at
least in their march to the attack of La Haye Sainte and the line
extending from this farm to the Papelotte. I was not present; but
several officers have assured me that at one time the troops were formed
in columns by divisions of two brigades each, the battalions being
deployed behind each other at six paces' interval.

This circumstance demonstrates how much is wanting in the military terms
of the French. We give the same name of _division_ to masses of four
regiments and to fractions of a battalion of two companies each,--which
is absurd. Let us suppose, for example, that Napoleon had directed on
the 18th of June, 1815, the formation of the line in columns by
divisions and by battalions, intending that the regulation of 1813
should be followed. His lieutenants might naturally have understood it
very differently, and, according to their interpretation of the order,
would have executed one of the following formations:--

1. Either the four divisions of the right wing would have been formed in
four large masses, each one of eight or twelve battalions, (according to
the strength of the regiments,) as is indicated in this figure for eight
battalions.[57]

2. Or each division would have been formed in eight or twelve columns of
battalions by divisions of two platoons or companies, according to the
system I have proposed, as in this figure, viz.:--

I do not mean to assert positively that this confusion of words led to
the deep masses at Waterloo; but it might have done so; and it is
important that in every language there should be two different terms to
express two such different things as a _division_ of twelve battalions
and a _division_ of a quarter of a battalion.

Struck with what precedes, I thought it proper to modify my Summary
already referred to, which was too concise, and in my revision of it I
devoted a chapter to the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages
of the different formations for battle. I also added some considerations
relative to a mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which
consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the
central one, the other two being in column on the wings.

* * * * *

After these discussions, I drew the conclusions:--

1. That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive.

2. That the system of Benningsen might, according to circumstances, be
as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was
successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento.

3. That the most skillful tactician would experience great difficulty in
marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks over
an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient
order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the
front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry.

I have never seen any thing of the kind in my experience. I regard it as
impossible, and am convinced that such a line could not advance to the
attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for
success.

Napoleon was in the habit of addressing his marshals in these
terms:--"Take your troops up in good order, and make a vigorous assault
upon the enemy." I ask, what means is there of carrying up to the
assault of an enemy forty or fifty deployed battalions as a whole in
good order? They will reach the enemy in detachments disconnected from
each other, and the commander cannot exercise any control over the mass
as a whole.

I saw nothing of this kind either at Ulm, Jena, Eylau, Bautzen, Dresden,
Culm, or Leipsic; neither did it occur at Austerlitz, Friedland,
Katzbach, or Dennewitz.

I am not aware that Wellington, in any of his battles, ever marched in
deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. He generally
awaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he gained the victory by
maneuvers against the flanks; and at Toulouse Soult's right wing was
beaten while descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, what
fate would have befallen the English army if, leaving the plateau of
Mont Saint-Jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack Napoleon in
position on the heights of La Belle Alliance?

I will be pardoned for these recapitulations, as they seem to be
necessary to the solution of a question which has arisen since my
Summary of the Art of War was written.

Some German generals, recognizing fully the advantages derived in 1813
from the system of columns of battalions, have endeavored to add to its
value by dividing up the columns and increasing their number, so as to
make them more shallow and to facilitate their deployment. With this
view, they propose, instead of forming four divisions or companies one
behind the other, to place them beside each other, not deployed, but in
small columns. That is, if the battalion consists of four companies of
two hundred and forty men each, each company is to be divided into four
sections of sixty each: one of these sections will be dispersed as
skirmishers, and the other three, in two ranks, will form a small
column; so that the battalion, instead of forming one column, will form
four, and the regiment of three battalions will form twelve small
columns instead of three--