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The Art of War written by Baron Henri de Jomini

B >> Baron Henri de Jomini >> The Art of War




If a general desires to be a successful actor in the great drama of war,
his first duty is to study carefully the theater of operations, that he
may see clearly the relative advantages and disadvantages it presents
for himself and his enemies. This being done, he can understandingly
proceed to prepare his base of operations, then to choose the most
suitable zone of operations for his main efforts, and, in doing so, keep
constantly before his mind the principles of the art of war relative to
lines and fronts of operations. The offensive army should particularly
endeavor to cut up the opposing army by skillfully selecting objective
points of maneuver; it will then assume, as the objects of its
subsequent undertakings, geographical points of more or less importance,
depending upon its first successes.

The defensive army, on the contrary, should endeavor, by all means, to
neutralize the first forward movement of its adversary, protracting
operations as long as possible while not compromising the fate of the
war, and deferring a decisive battle until the time when a portion of
the enemy's forces are either exhausted by labors, or scattered for the
purpose of occupying invaded provinces, masking fortified places,
covering sieges, protecting the line of operations, depots, &c.

Up to this point every thing relates to a first plan of operations; but
no plan can provide with certainty for that which is uncertain
always,--the character and the issue of the first conflict. If your
lines of operations have been skillfully chosen and your movements well
concealed, and if on the other hand your enemy makes false movements
which permit you to fall on fractions of his army, you maybe successful
in your campaign, without fighting general battles, by the simple use of
your strategic advantages. But if the two parties seem about equally
matched at the time of conflict, there will result one of those
stupendous tragedies like Borodino, Wagram, Waterloo, Bautzen, and
Dresden, where the precepts of grand tactics, as indicated in the
chapter on that subject, must have a powerful influence.

If a few prejudiced military men, after reading this book and carefully
studying the detailed and correct history of the campaigns of the great
masters of the art of war, still contend that it has neither principles
nor rules, I can only pity them, and reply, in the famous words of
Frederick, that "a mule which had made twenty campaigns under Prince
Eugene would not be a better tactician than at the beginning."

Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual
events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true
school of instruction for generals. If these means do not produce great
men, they will at least produce generals of sufficient skill to take
rank next after the natural masters of the art of war.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 51: The well-known Spanish proverb, _He was brave on such a
day_, may be applied to nations as to individuals. The French at
Rossbach were not the same people as at Jena, nor the Prussians at
Prentzlow as at Dennewitz.]

[Footnote 52: The unskillful conduct of a subordinate who is incapable
of understanding the merit of a maneuver which has been ordered, and who
will commit grave faults in its execution, may produce the same result
of causing the failure of the plans of an excellent commander.]




SUPPLEMENT

TO THE

SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.


My Summary of the Art of War, published in 1836, to assist in the
military instruction of the Hereditary Grand Duke of Russia, contained a
concluding article that was never printed. I deem it expedient to give
it now in the form of a supplement, and add a special article upon the
means of acquiring a certain and ready strategic _coup-d'oeil_.

It is essential for the reader of my Summary to understand clearly that
in the military science, as in every other, the study of details is easy
for the man who has learned how to seize the fundamental features to
which all others are secondary. I am about to attempt a development of
these elements of the art; and my readers should endeavor to apprehend
them clearly and to apply them properly.

I cannot too often repeat that the theory of the great combinations of
war is in itself very simple, and requires nothing more than ordinary
intelligence and careful consideration. Notwithstanding its simplicity,
many learned military men have difficulty in grasping it thoroughly.
Their minds wander off to accessory details, in place of fixing
themselves on first causes, and they go a long way in search of what is
just within their reach if they only would think so.

Two very different things must exist in a man to make him a general: _he
must know how to arrange a good plan of operations, and how to carry it
to a successful termination_. The first of these talents may be a
natural gift, but it may also be acquired and developed by study. The
second depends more on individual character, is rather a personal
attribute, and cannot be created by study, although it may be improved.

It is particularly necessary for a monarch or the head of a government
to possess the first of these talents, because in such case, although he
may not have the ability to execute, he can arrange plans of operations
and decide correctly as to the excellence or defects of those submitted
to him by others. He is thus enabled to estimate properly the capacity
of his generals, and when he finds a general producing a good plan, and
having firmness and coolness, such a man may be safely trusted with the
command of an army.

If, on the other hand, the head of a state is a man of executive
ability, but not possessing the faculty of arranging wise military
combinations, he will be likely to commit all the faults that have
characterized the campaigns of many celebrated warriors who were only
brave soldiers without being at all improved by study.

From the principles which I have laid down, and their application to
several famous campaigns, my readers will perceive that the theory of
the great combinations of war may be summed up in the following truths.

The science of strategy consists, in the first place, in knowing how to
choose well a theater of war and to estimate correctly that of the
enemy. To do this, a general must accustom himself to decide as to the
importance of decisive points,--which is not a difficult matter when he
is aided by the hints I have given on the subject, particularly in
Articles from XVIII. to XXII.

The art consists, next, in a proper employment of the troops upon the
theater of operations, whether offensive or defensive. (See Article
XVII.) This employment of the forces should be regulated by two
fundamental principles: the first being, _to obtain by free and rapid
movements the advantage of bringing the mass of the troops against
fractions of the enemy; the second, to strike in the most decisive
direction_,--that is to say, in that direction where the consequences of
his defeat may be most disastrous to the enemy, while at the same time
his success would yield him no great advantages.

The whole science of great military combination is comprised in these
two fundamental truths. Therefore, all movements that are disconnected
or more extended than those of the enemy would be grave faults; so also
would the occupation of a position that was too much cut up, or sending
out a large detachment unnecessarily. On the contrary, every
well-connected, compact system of operations would be wise; so also with
central strategic lines, and every strategic position less extended than
the enemy's.

The application of these fundamental principles is also very simple. If
you have one hundred battalions against an equal number of the enemy's,
you may, by their mobility and by taking the initiative, bring eighty of
them to the decisive point while employing the remaining twenty to
observe and deceive half of the opposing army. You will thus have eighty
battalions against fifty at the point where the important contest is to
take place. You will reach this point by rapid marches, by interior
lines, or by a general movement toward one extremity of the hostile
line. I have indicated the cases in which one or the other of these
means is to be preferred. (See pages 114 and following.)

In arranging a plan of operations, it is important to remember _"that a
strategic theater, as well as every position occupied by an army, has a
center and two extremities."_ A theater has usually three zones,--a
right, a left, and a central.

In choosing a zone of operations, select one,--1, that will furnish a
safe and advantageous base; 2, in which the least risk will be run by
yourself, while the enemy will be most exposed to injury; 3, bearing in
mind the antecedent situations of the two parties, and, 4, the
dispositions and inclinations of the powers whose territories are near
the theater of war.

One of the zones will always be decidedly bad or dangerous, while the
other two will be more or less suitable according to circumstances.

The zone and base being fixed upon, the object of the first attempts
must be selected. This is choosing an objective of operations. There are
two very different kinds: some, that are called _territorial or
geographical objectives_, refer simply to an enemy's line of defense
which it is desired to get possession of, or a fortress or intrenched
camp to be captured; _the others, on the contrary, consist entirely in
the destruction or disorganization of the enemy's forces, without giving
attention to geographical points of any kind_. This was the favorite
objective of Napoleon.[53]

I can profitably add nothing to what I have already written on this
point, (page 86;) _and, as the choice of the objective is by far the
most important thing in a plan of operations_, I recommend the whole of
Article XIX., (pages 84 and following.)

The objective being determined upon, the army will move toward it by one
or two lines of operations, care being taken to conform to the
fundamental principle laid down, and to avoid double lines, unless the
character of the theater of war makes it necessary to use them, or the
enemy is very inferior either in the number or the quality of his
troops. Article XXI. treats this subject fully. If two geographical
lines are used, it is essential to move the great mass of the forces
along the most important of them, and to occupy the secondary line by
detachments having a concentric direction, if possible, with the main
body.

The army, being on its way toward the objective, before arriving in
presence of the enemy and giving battle, occupies daily or temporary
strategic positions: the front it embraces, or that upon which the enemy
may attack, is its front of operations. There is an important
consideration with reference to the direction of the front of operations
and to changes it may receive, which I have dwelt upon in Article XX.,
(page 93.)

The fundamental principle requires, even when the forces are equal, that
the front be less extensive than the enemy's,--especially if the front
remains unchanged for some time. If your strategic positions are more
closely connected than the enemy's, you can concentrate more rapidly and
more easily than he can, and in this way the fundamental principle will
be applied. If your positions are interior and central, the enemy cannot
concentrate except by passing by the mass of your divisions or by moving
in a circle around them: he is then exactly in a condition not to be
able to apply the fundamental principle, while it is your most obvious
measure.

But if you are very weak and the enemy very strong, a central position,
that may be surrounded on all sides by forces superior at every point,
is untenable, unless the enemy's corps are very far separated from each
other, as was the case with the allied armies in the Seven Years' War;
or unless the central zone has a natural barrier on one or two of its
sides, like the Rhine, the Danube, or the Alps, which would prevent the
enemy from using his forces simultaneously. In case of great numerical
inferiority it is, nevertheless, wiser to maneuver upon one of the
extremities than upon the center of the enemy's line, especially if his
masses are sufficiently near to be dangerous to you.

It was stated above that strategy, besides indicating the decisive
points of a theater of war, requires two things:--1st, that the
principal mass of the force be moved against fractions of the enemy's,
to attack them in succession; 2d, that the best direction of movement be
adopted,--that is to say, one leading straight to the decisive points
already known, and afterward upon secondary points.

To illustrate these immutable principles of strategy, I will give a
sketch of the operations of the French at the close of 1793. (See Plate
III.)

It will be recollected that the allies had ten principal corps on the
frontier of France from the Rhine to the North Sea.

The Duke of York was attacking Dunkirk. (No. 1.)

Marshal Freytag was covering the siege. (No. 2.)

The Prince of Orange was occupying an intermediate position at Menin.
(No. 3.)

The Prince of Coburg, with the main army, was attacking Maubeuge, and
was guarding the space between that place and the Scheldt by strong
detachments. (No. 4.)

Clairfayt was covering the siege. (No. 5.)

Benjouski was covering Charleroi and the Meuse, toward Thuin and
Charleroi, the fortifications of which were being rebuilt. (No. 6.)

Another corps was covering the Ardennes and Luxembourg. (No. 7.)

The Prussians were besieging Landau. (No. 8.)

The Duke of Brunswick was covering the siege in the Vosges. (No. 9.)

General Wurmser was observing Strasbourg and the army of the Rhine. (No.
10.)

The French, besides the detachments in front of each of the hostile
corps, had five principal masses in the camps of Lille, Douai, Guise,
Sarre Louis, and Strasbourg, (a, b, c, d, e.) A strong reserve, (g,)
composed of the best troops drawn from the camps of the northern
frontier, was intended to be thrown upon all the points of the enemy's
line in succession, assisted by the troops already in the neighborhood,
(i, k, l, m.)

This reserve; assisted by the divisions of the camp of Cassel near
Dunkirk, commenced its operations by beating corps 1 and 2, under the
Duke of York; then that of the Dutch, (No. 3,) at Menin; next that of
Clairfayt, (5,) before Maubeuge; finally, joining the army of the
Moselle toward Sarre Louis, it beat the Duke of Brunswick in the Vosges,
and, with the assistance of the army of the Rhine, (f,) drove Wurmser
from the lines of Wissembourg.

The general principle was certainly well applied, and every similar
operation will be praiseworthy. But, as the Austrians composed half the
allied forces, and they had their lines of retreat from the points 4, 5,
and 6 upon the Rhine, it is evident that if the French had collected
three of their large corps in order to move them against Benjouski at
Thuin, (No. 6,) and then fallen upon the Prince of Coburg's left by the
Charleroi road, they would have thrown the imperial army upon the North
Sea, and would have obtained immense results.

The Committee of Public Safety deemed it a matter of great importance
that Dunkirk should not be permitted to fell into the hands of the
English. Besides this, York's corps, encamped on the downs, might be
cut off and thrown upon the sea; and the disposable French masses for
this object were at Douai, Lille, and Cassel: so that there were good
reasons for commencing operations by attacking the English. The
principal undertaking failed, because Houchard did not appreciate the
strategic advantage he had, and did not know how to act on the line of
retreat of the Anglo-Hanoverian army. He was guillotined, by way of
punishment, although he saved Dunkirk; yet he failed to cut off the
English as he might have done.

It will be observed that this movement of the French reserve along the
whole front was the cause of five victories, neither of which had
decisive results, _because the attacks were made in front_, and because,
when the cities were relieved, the allied armies not being cut through,
and the French reserve moving on to the different points in succession,
none of the victories was pushed to its legitimate consequences. If the
French had based themselves upon the five fortified towns on the Meuse,
had collected one hundred thousand men by bold and rapid marches, had
fallen upon the center of those separated corps, had crushed Benjouski,
assailed the Prince of Coburg in his rear, beaten him, and pursued him
vigorously as Napoleon pursued at Ratisbon, and as he wished to do at
Ligny in 1815, the result would have been very different.

I have mentioned this example, as it illustrates very well the two
important points to be attended to in the strategic management of masses
of troops; that is, their employment at different points in succession
and at decisive points.[54]

Every educated military man will be impressed by the truths educed, and
will be convinced that the excellence of maneuvers will depend upon
their conforming to the principle already insisted upon; that is to say,
the great part of the force must be moved against one wing or the
center, according to the position of the enemy's masses. It is of
importance in battles to calculate distances with still greater
accuracy; for the results of movements on the battle-field following
them more rapidly than in the case of strategic maneuvers, every
precaution must be taken to avoid exposing any part of the line to a
dangerous attack from the enemy, especially if he is compactly drawn up.
Add to these things calmness during the action; the ability to choose
positions for fighting battles in the manner styled the defensive with
_offensive returns_, (Art. XXX.;) the simultaneous employment of the
forces in striking the decisive blow, (see pages from 202 to 204;) the
faculty of arousing the soldiers and moving them forward at opportune
moments; and we have mentioned every thing which can assist, as far as
the general is concerned, in assuring victories, and every thing which
will constitute him a skillful tactician.

It is almost always easy to determine the decisive point of a field of
battle, but not so with the decisive moment; and it is precisely here
that genius and experience are every thing, and mere theory of little
value.

It is important, also, to consider attentively Article XLII., which
explains how a general may make a small number of suppositions as to
what the enemy may or can do, and as to what course of conduct he shall
himself pursue upon those hypotheses. He may thus accustom himself to be
prepared for any eventuality.

I must also call attention to Article XXVIII., upon great detachments.
These are necessary evils, and, if not managed with great care, may
prove ruinous to the best armies. The essential rules on this point are,
to make as few detachments as possible, _to have them readily movable_,
to draw them back to the main body as soon as practicable, and to give
them good instructions for avoiding disasters.

I have nothing to say relative to the first two chapters on military
policy; for they are themselves nothing more than a brief summary of
this part of the art of war, which chiefly concerns statesmen, but
should be thoroughly understood by military men. I will, however,
invite special attention to Article XIV., relating to the command of
armies or to the choice of generals-in-chief,--a subject worthy the most
anxious care upon the part of a wise government; for upon it often
depends the safety of the nation.

We may be confident that a good strategist will make a good chief of
staff for an army; but for the command in chief is required a man of
tried qualities, of high character and known energy. The united action
of two such men as commander-in-chief and chief of staff, when a great
captain of the first order cannot be had, may produce the most brilliant
results.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 53: The objective may be in some degree
_political_,--especially in cases of wars of intervention in the affairs
of another country; but it then really becomes geographical.]

[Footnote 54: The operations mentioned show the advantage of employing
masses at the decisive point, not because it was done in 1793, but
because it was not done. If Napoleon had been in Carnot's place, he
would have fallen with all his force upon Charleroi, whence be would
have attacked the left of the Prince of Coburg and cut his line of
retreat. Let any one compare the results of Carnot's half-skillful
operations with the wise maneuvers of Saint-Bernard and Jena, and be
convinced.]




NOTE

UPON

THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING A GOOD STRATEGIC COUP-D'OEIL.


The study of the principles of strategy can produce no valuable
practical results if we do nothing more than keep them in remembrance,
never trying to apply them, with map in hand, to hypothetical wars, or
to the brilliant operations of great captains. By such exercises may be
procured a rapid and certain strategic _coup-d'oeil_,--the most valuable
characteristic of a good general, without which he can never put in
practice the finest theories in the world.

When a military man who is a student of his art has become fully
impressed by the advantages procured by moving a strong mass against
successive fractions of the enemy's force, and particularly when he
recognizes the importance of constantly directing the main efforts upon
decisive points of the theater of operations, he will naturally desire
to be able to perceive at a glance what are these decisive points. I
have already, in Chapter III., page 70, of the preceding Summary,
indicated the simple means by which this knowledge may be obtained.
There is, in fact, one truth of remarkable simplicity which obtains in
all the combinations of a methodical war. It is this:--_in every
position a general may occupy, he has only to decide whether to operate
by the right, by the left, or by the front_.

To be convinced of the correctness of this assertion, let us first take
this general in his private office at the opening of the war. His first
care will be to choose that zone of operations which will give him the
greatest number of chances of success and be the least dangerous for him
in case of reverse. As no theater of operations can have more than three
zones, (that of the right, that of the center, and that of the left,)
and as I have in Articles from XVII. to XXII. pointed out the manner of
perceiving the advantages and dangers of these zones, the choice of a
zone of operations will be a matter of no difficulty.

When the general has finally chosen a zone within which to operate with
the principal portion of his forces, and when these forces shall be
established in that zone, the army will have a front of operations
toward the hostile army, which will also have one. Now, these fronts of
operations will each have its right, left, and center. It only remains,
then, for the general to decide upon which of these directions he can
injure the enemy most,--for this will always be the best, especially if
he can move upon it without endangering his own communications. I have
dwelt upon this point also in the preceding Summary.

Finally, when the two armies are in presence of each other upon the
field of battle where the decisive collision is to ensue, and are upon
the point of coming to blows, they will each have a right, left, and
center; and it remains for the general to decide still between these
three directions of striking.

Let us take, as an illustration of the truths I have mentioned, the
theater of operations, already referred to, between the Rhine and the
North Sea. (See Fig. 39.)

Although this theater presents, in one point of view, four geographical
sections,--viz.: the space between the Rhine and the Moselle, that
between the Moselle and the Meuse, that between the Meuse and the
Scheldt, and that between the last river and the sea,--it is
nevertheless true that an army of which A A is the base and B B the
front of operations will have only three general directions to choose
from; for the two spaces in the center will form a single central zone,
as it will always have one on the right and another on the left.

[Illustration: Fig. 39.]

The army B B, wishing to take the offensive against the army CC, whose
base was the Rhine, would have three directions in which to operate. If
it maneuvered by the extreme right, descending the Moselle, (toward D,)
it would evidently threaten the enemy's line of retreat toward the
Rhine; but he, concentrating the mass of his forces toward Luxembourg,
might fall upon the left of the army D and compel it to change front and
fight a battle with its rear toward the Rhine, causing its ruin if
seriously defeated.

If, on the contrary, the army B wished to make its greatest effort upon
the left, (toward E,) in order to take advantage of the finely-fortified
towns of Lille and Valenciennes, it would be exposed to inconveniences
still more serious than before. For the army CC, concentrating in force
toward Audenarde, might fall on the right of B, and, outflanking this
wing in the battle, might throw it upon the impassable country toward
Antwerp between the Scheldt and the sea,--where there would remain but
two things for it to do: either to surrender at discretion, or cut its
way through the enemy at the sacrifice of half its numbers.