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The Art of War written by Baron Henri de Jomini

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6. It is also of importance, especially in cavalry, that the
commander-in-chief increase the depth rather than the extent of the
formation. For example, in a deployed division of two brigades it would
not be a good plan for one brigade to form in a single line behind the
other, but each brigade should have one regiment in the first line and
one in the second. Each unit of the line will thus have its own proper
reserve behind it,--an advantage not to be regarded as trifling; for in
a charge events succeed each other so rapidly that it is impossible for
a general to control the deployed regiments.

By adopting this arrangement, each general of brigade will be able to
dispose of his own reserve; and it would be well, also, to have a
general reserve for the whole division. This consideration leads me to
think that five regiments would make a good division. The charge may
then be made in line by brigades of two regiments, the fifth serving as
a general reserve behind the center. Or three regiments may form the
line, and two may be in column, one behind each wing. Or it may be
preferable to use a mixed order, deploying two regiments and keeping the
others in column. This is a good arrangement, because the three
regiments, formed in columns by divisions behind the center and flanks
of the line, cover those points, and can readily pass the line if it is
beaten back. (See Fig. 38.)

[Illustration: Fig. 38. Cavalry division of five regiments.

Cavalry deployed should be in checkered order rather than in full
lines.]

7. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all
encounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first line must
sooner or later be checked; for, even upon the supposition of the first
charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy
will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at
length be forced to rally behind the second. The other point is that,
with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, the victory will
remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness
to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also
engaged.

Attention to these truths will bring us to a just conclusion as to the
proper method of forming a large mass of cavalry for battle.

Whatever order be adopted, care must be taken to avoid deploying large
cavalry corps in full lines; for a mass thus drawn up is very
unmanageable, and if the first line is checked suddenly in its career
the second is also, and that without having an opportunity to strike a
blow. This has been demonstrated many times. Take as an example the
attack made by Nansouty in columns of regiments upon the Prussian
cavalry deployed in front of Chateau-Thierry.

In opposing the formation of cavalry in more than two lines, I never
intended to exclude the use of several lines checkerwise or in echelons,
or of reserves formed in columns. I only meant to say that when cavalry,
expecting to make a charge, is drawn up in lines one behind the other,
the whole mass will be thrown into confusion as soon as the first line
breaks and turns.[49]

With cavalry still more than with infantry the _morale_ is very
important. The quickness of eye and the coolness of the commander, and
the intelligence and bravery of the soldier, whether in the _melee_ or
in the rally, will oftener be the means of assuring a victory than the
adoption of this or that formation. When, however, a good formation is
adopted and the advantages mentioned above are also present, the
victory is more certain; and nothing can excuse the use of a vicious
formation.

The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the old
disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will in the end get
the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious
encounters, will retreat with the speed of the Parthians and return to
the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy
by continual skirmishing. Lloyd has decided in the negative; and several
exploits of the Cossacks when engaged with the excellent French cavalry
seem to confirm his opinion. (When I speak of excellent French cavalry,
I refer to its impetuous bravery, and not to its perfection; for it does
not compare with the Russian or German cavalry either in horsemanship,
organization, or in care of the animals.) We must by no means conclude
it possible for a body of light cavalry deployed as skirmishers to
accomplish as much as the Cossacks or other irregular cavalry. They
acquire a habit of moving in an apparently disorderly manner, whilst
they are all the time directing their individual efforts toward a common
object. The most practiced hussars can never perform such service as the
Cossacks, Tscherkesses, and Turks do instinctively.

Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the
best cavalry in partial skirmishes; but it has also demonstrated that
they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate
of a war may depend. Such charges are valuable accessories to an attack
in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results.

From the preceding facts we learn that it is always best to give cavalry
a regular organization, and furnish them long weapons, not omitting,
however, to provide, for skirmishing, &c., an irregular cavalry armed
with pistols, lances, and sabers.

Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a
numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great
influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may excite a
feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country, it can
carry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, make his
communications very perilous, and destroy the _ensemble_ of his
operations. In a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising
_en masse_ of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and
rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty
in his calculations.

Any system of organization, therefore, will be a good one which provides
for great enlargement of the cavalry in time of war by the incorporation
of militia; for they may, with the aid of a few good regular squadrons,
be made excellent partisan soldiers. These militia would certainly not
possess all the qualities of those warlike wandering tribes who live on
horseback and seem born cavalry-soldiers; but they could in a measure
supply the places of such. In this respect Russia is much better off
than any of her neighbors, both on account of the number and quality of
her horsemen of the Don, and the character of the irregular militia she
can bring into the field at very short notice.

Twenty years ago I made the following statements in Chapter XXXV. of the
Treatise on Grand Military Operations, when writing on this subject:--

"The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Russian army are not to
be estimated. These light troops, which are insignificant in the shock
of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks,) are terrible in
pursuits and in a war of posts. They are a most formidable obstacle to
the execution of a general's designs,--because he can never be sure of
the arrival and carrying out of his orders, his convoys are always in
danger, and his operations uncertain. If an army has had only a few
regiments of these half-regular cavalry-soldiers, their real value has
not been known; but when their number increases to fifteen thousand or
twenty thousand, their usefulness is fully recognized,--especially in a
country where the population is not hostile to them.

"When they are in the vicinity, every convoy must be provided with a
strong escort, and no movement can be expected to be undisturbed. Much
unusual labor is thus made necessary upon the part of the opponent's
regular cavalry, which is soon broken down by the unaccustomed fatigue.

"Volunteer hussars or lancers, raised at the time of war breaking out,
may be nearly as valuable as the Cossacks, if they are well officered
and move freely about from point to point."

In the Hungarians, Transylvanians, and Croats, Austria has resources
possessed by few other states. The services rendered by mounted militia
have proved, however, that this kind of cavalry may be very useful, if
for no other purpose than relieving the regular cavalry of those
occasional and extra duties to be performed in all armies, such as
forming escorts, acting as orderlies, protecting convoys, serving on
outposts, &c. Mixed corps of regular and irregular cavalry may often be
more really useful than if they were entirely composed of cavalry of the
line,--because the fear of compromising a body of these last often
restrains a general from pushing them forward in daring operations where
he would not hesitate to risk his irregulars, and he may thus lose
excellent opportunities of accomplishing great results.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 49: To disprove my statement, M. Wagner cites the case of the
battle of Ramillies, where Marlborough, by a general charge of cavalry
in fall lines, succeeded in beating the French drawn up checkerwise.
Unless my memory deceives me, the allied cavalry was at first formed
checkered in two lines; but the real cause of Marlborough's success was
his seeing that Villeroi had paralyzed half his army behind Anderkirch
and Gette, and his having the good sense to withdraw thirty-eight
squadrons from this wing to reinforce his left, which in this way had
twice as many cavalry as the French, and outflanked them. But I
cheerfully admit that there may be many exceptions to a rule which I
have not laid down more absolutely than all others relating to cavalry
tactics,--a tactics, by the way, as changeable as the arm itself.]




ARTICLE XLVI.

Employment of Artillery.


Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and
defensive. As an offensive means, a great battery well managed may break
an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for the
troops that are to make an assault. As a defensive means, it doubles the
strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it
inflicts upon the enemy while at a distance, and the consequent moral
effect upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of
approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. It is no less
important in the attack and defense of fortified places or intrenched
camps; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems of
fortification.

I have already in a former portion of this book given some directions as
to the distribution of artillery in a line of battle; but it is
difficult to explain definitely the proper method of using it in the
battle itself. It will not be right to say that artillery can act
independently of the other arms, for it is rather an accessory. At
Wagram, however, Napoleon threw a battery of one hundred pieces into the
gap left by the withdrawal of Massena's corps, and thus held in check
the Austrian center, notwithstanding their vigorous efforts to advance.
This was a special case, and should not be often imitated.

I will content myself with laying down a few fundamental rules,
observing that they refer to the present state of artillery service,
(1838.) The recent discoveries not yet being fully tested, I shall say
little with reference to them.

1. In the offensive, a certain portion of the artillery should
concentrate its fire upon the point where a decisive blow is to be
struck. Its first use is to shatter the enemy's line, and then it
assists with its fire the attack of the infantry and cavalry.

2. Several batteries of horse-artillery should follow the offensive
movements of the columns of attack, besides the foot-batteries intended
for the same purpose. Too much foot-artillery should not move with an
offensive column. It may be posted so as to co-operate with the column
without accompanying it. When the cannoneers can mount the boxes, it may
have greater mobility and be advanced farther to the front.

3. It has already been stated that half of the horse-artillery should be
held in reserve, that it may be rapidly moved to any required point.[50]
For this purpose it should be placed upon the most open ground, whence
it can move readily in every direction. I have already indicated the
best positions for the heavy calibers.

4. The batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along the
defensive line, should give their attention particularly to those points
where the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account of
the facility or the advantage of so doing. The general of artillery
should therefore know the decisive strategic and tactical points of the
battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. The
distribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these.

5. Artillery placed on level ground or ground sloping gently to the
front is most favorably situated either for point-blank or ricochet
firing: a converging fire is the best.

6. It should be borne in mind that the chief office of all artillery in
battles is to overwhelm the enemy's troops, and not to reply to their
batteries. It is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries,
in order to attract their fire. A third of the disposable artillery may
be assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be directed
against the infantry and cavalry of the enemy.

7. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavor
to cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. If guns can
be so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect is
produced.

8. When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. It
is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank
and reverse. The moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is
inconceivable; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it.
The fine movement of Ney on Preititz at Bautzen was neutralized by a few
pieces of Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked
them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he
was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards
upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far
overbalancing the risks run.

9. Batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, and
especially on their flanks. Cases may occur where the rule may be
deviated from: Wagram is a very remarkable example of this.

10. It is very important that artillerists, when threatened by cavalry,
preserve their coolness. They should fire first solid shot, next shells,
and then grape, as long as possible. The infantry supports should, in
such a case, form squares in the vicinity, to shelter the horses, and,
when necessary, the cannoneers. When the infantry is drawn up behind
the pieces, large squares of sufficient size to contain whatever they
should cover are best; but when the infantry is on the flanks, smaller
squares are better. Rocket-batteries may also be very efficient in
frightening the horses.

11. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue its
fire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon.
The cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack if the
battery is properly supported. This is a case for the co-operation of
the three arms; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by
the artillery, a combined attack upon it by cavalry and infantry will
cause its destruction.

12. The proportions of artillery have varied in different wars. Napoleon
conquered Italy in 1800 with forty or fifty pieces,--whilst in 1812 he
invaded Russia with one thousand pieces thoroughly equipped, and failed.
These facts show that any fixed rule on the subject is inadmissible.
Usually three pieces to a thousand combatants are allowed; but this
allowance will depend on circumstances.

The relative proportions of heavy and light artillery vary also between
wide limits. It is a great mistake to have too much heavy artillery,
whose mobility must be much less than that of the lighter calibers. A
remarkable proof of the great importance of having a strong
artillery-armament was given by Napoleon after the battle of Eylau. The
great havoc occasioned among his troops by the numerous guns of the
Russians opened his eyes to the necessity of increasing his own. With
wonderful vigor, he set all the Prussian arsenals to work, those along
the Rhine, and even at Metz, to increase the number of his pieces, and
to cast new ones in order to enable him to use the munitions previously
captured. In three months he doubled the _materiel_ and _personnel_ of
his artillery, at a distance of one thousand miles from his own
frontiers,--a feat without a parallel in the annals of war.

13. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advantage
is to place in command of it a general who is at once a good strategist
and tactician. This chief should be authorized to dispose not only of
the reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the
different corps or divisions of the army. He should also consult with
the commanding general as to the moment and place of concentration of
the mass of his artillery in order to contribute most to a successful
issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thus
massing his artillery without previous orders from the commanding
general.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 50: Greater mobility is now given to foot-artillery by
mounting the men on the boxes.]




ARTICLE XLVII.

Of the Combined Use of the Three Arms.


To conclude this Summary in a proper manner, I ought to treat of the
combined use of the three arms; but I am restrained from so doing by
considering the great variety of points necessary to be touched upon if
I should attempt to go into an examination of all the detailed
operations that would arise in the application of the general rules laid
down for each of the arms.

Several authors--chiefly German--have treated this subject very
extensively, and their labors are valuable principally because they
consist mainly of citations of numerous examples taken from the actual
minor engagements of the later wars. These examples must indeed take the
place of rules, since experience has shown that fixed rules on the
subject cannot be laid down. It seems a waste of breath to say that the
commander of a body of troops composed of the three arms should employ
them so that they will give mutual support and assistance; but, after
all, this is the only fundamental rule that can be established, for the
attempt to prescribe for such a commander a special course of conduct in
every case that may arise, when these cases may be infinitely varied,
would involve him in an inextricable labyrinth of instructions. As the
object and limits of this Summary do not allow me to enter upon the
consideration of such details, I can only refer my readers to the best
works which do treat of them.

I have said all I can properly say when I advise that the different arms
be posted in conformity with the character of the ground, according to
the object in view and the supposed designs of the enemy, and that they
be used simultaneously in the manner best suited to them, care being
taken to enable them to afford mutual support. A careful study of the
events of previous wars, and especially experience in the operations of
war, will give an officer correct ideas on these points, and the ability
to use, at the right time and place, his knowledge of the properties of
the three arms, either single or combined.




CONCLUSION.


I am constrained to recapitulate the principal facts which may be
regarded as fundamental in war. War in its _ensemble_ is not a science,
but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed
laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of
war viewed as a whole. Among other things, combats may be mentioned as
often being quite independent of scientific combinations, and they may
become essentially dramatic, personal qualities and inspirations and a
thousand other things frequently being the controlling elements. The
passions which agitate the masses that are brought into collision, the
warlike qualities of these masses, the energy and talent of their
commanders, the spirit, more or less martial, of nations and
epochs,[51]--in a word, every thing that can be called the poetry and
metaphysics of war,--will have a permanent influence on its results.

Shall I be understood as saying that there are no such things as
tactical rules, and that no theory of tactics can be useful? What
military man of intelligence would be guilty of such an absurdity? Are
we to imagine that Eugene and Marlborough triumphed simply by
inspiration or by the superior courage and discipline of their
battalions? Or do we find in the events of Turin, Blenheim, and
Ramillies maneuvers resembling those seen at Talavera, Waterloo, Jena,
or Austerlitz, which were the causes of the victory in each case? When
the application of a rule and the consequent maneuver have procured
victory a hundred times for skillful generals, and always have in their
favor the great probability of leading to success, shall their
occasional failure be a sufficient reason for entirely denying their
value and for distrusting the effect of the study of the art? Shall a
theory be pronounced absurd because it has only three-fourths of the
whole number of chances of success in its favor?

The _morale_ of an army and its chief officers has an influence upon the
fate of a war; and this seems to be due to a certain physical effect
produced by the moral cause. For example, the impetuous attack upon a
hostile line of twenty thousand brave men whose feelings are thoroughly
enlisted in their cause will produce a much more powerful effect than
the attack of forty thousand demoralized or apathetic men upon the same
point.

Strategy, as has already been explained, is the art of bringing the
greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the
theater of war or of the zone of operations.

Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they
shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches; that is to say, the
art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point
of the field of battle. When troops are thinking more of flight than of
fight, they can no longer be termed active masses in the sense in which
I use the term.

A general thoroughly instructed in the theory of war, but not possessed
of military _coup-d'oeil_, coolness, and skill, may make an excellent
strategic plan and be entirely unable to apply the rules of tactics in
presence of an enemy: his projects will not be successfully carried out,
and his defeat will be probable. If he be a man of character, he will be
able to diminish the evil results of his failure, but if he lose his
wits he will lose his army.

The same general may, on the other hand, be at once a good tactician and
strategist, and have made all the arrangements for gaining a victory
that his means will permit: in this case, if he be only moderately
seconded by his troops and subordinate officers, he will probably gain a
decided victory. If, however, his troops have neither discipline nor
courage, and his subordinate officers envy and deceive him,[52] he will
undoubtedly see his fine hopes fade away, and his admirable combinations
can only have the effect of diminishing the disasters of an almost
unavoidable defeat.

No system of tactics can lead to victory when the _morale_ of an army is
bad; and even when it may be excellent the victory may depend upon some
occurrence like the rupture of the bridges over the Danube at Essling.
Neither will victories be necessarily gained or lost by rigid adherence
to or rejection of this or that manner of forming troops for battle.

These truths need not lead to the conclusion that there can be no sound
rules in war, the observance of which, the chances being equal, will
lead to success. It is true that theories cannot teach men with
mathematical precision what they should do in every possible case; but
it is also certain that they will always point out the errors which
should be avoided; and this is a highly-important consideration, for
these rules thus become, in the hands of skillful generals commanding
brave troops, means of almost certain success.

The correctness of this statement cannot be denied; and it only remains
to be able to discriminate between good rules and bad. In this ability
consists the whole of a man's genius for war. There are, however,
leading principles which assist in obtaining this ability. Every maxim
relating to war will be good if it indicates the employment of the
greatest portion of the means of action at the decisive moment and
place. In Chapter III. I have specified all the strategic combinations
which lead to such a result. As regards tactics, the principal thing to
be attended to is the choice of the most suitable order of battle for
the object in view. When we come to consider the action of masses on the
field, the means to be used may be an opportune charge of cavalry, a
strong battery put in position and unmasked at the proper moment, a
column of infantry making a headlong charge, or a deployed division
coolly and steadily pouring upon the enemy a fire, or they may consist
of tactical maneuvers intended to threaten the enemy's flanks or rear,
or any other maneuver calculated to diminish the confidence of the
adversary. Each of these things may, in a particular case, be the cause
of victory. To define the cases in which each should be preferred is
simply impossible.