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The Art of War written by Baron Henri de Jomini

B >> Baron Henri de Jomini >> The Art of War




There are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then
only as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a great
defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek protection
within the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the
sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the
army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province;
but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies, carried on
according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply
absurd.

There is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of
a retreat,--to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the
frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be
parallel to the frontier. For example, when Marshal Soult gave up the
line of the Pyrenees in 1814, he had to choose one of two directions for
his retreat,--either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of France,
or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the Pyrenees.
In the same way, when Frederick retired from Moravia, he marched toward
Bohemia instead of returning to Silesia.

These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that
they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the
center of its power. The propriety of giving such a direction to a
retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the
positions of the fortresses, the greater or less space the army may
have for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct
communications with the central portions of the state.

Spain is admirably suited to the use of this system. If a French army
penetrates by way of Bayonne, the Spaniards may base themselves upon
Pampeluna and Saragossa, or upon Leon and the Asturias; and in either
case the French cannot move directly to Madrid, because their line of
operations would be at the mercy of their adversary.

The frontier of the Turkish empire on the Danube presents the same
advantages, if the Turks knew how to profit by them.

In France also the parallel retreat may be used, especially when the
nation itself is not divided into two political parties each of which is
striving for the possession of the capital. If the hostile army
penetrates through the Alps, the French can act on the Rhone and the
Saone, passing around the frontier as far as the Moselle on one side, or
as far as Provence on the other. If the enemy enters the country by way
of Strasbourg, Mayence, or Valenciennes, the same thing can be done. The
occupation of Paris by the enemy would be impossible, or at least very
hazardous, so long as a French army remained in good condition and based
upon its circle of fortified towns. The same is the case for all
countries having double fronts of operations.[32]

Austria is perhaps not so fortunately situated, on account of the
directions of the Rhetian and Tyrolean Alps and of the river Danube.
Lloyd, however, considers Bohemia and the Tyrol as two bastions
connected by the strong curtain of the river Inn, and regards this
frontier as exceedingly well suited for parallel movements. This
assertion was not well sustained by the events of the campaigns of 1800,
1805, and 1809; but, as the parallel method has not yet had a fair trial
on that ground, the question is still an open one.

It seems to me that the propriety of applying the parallel method
depends mainly upon the existing and the antecedent circumstances of
each case. If a French army should approach from the Rhine by way of
Bavaria, and should find allies in force upon the Lech and the Iser, it
would be a very delicate operation to throw the whole Austrian army into
the Tyrol and into Bohemia, with the expectation of arresting in this
way the forward movement to Vienna. If half the Austrian army is left
upon the Inn to cover the approaches to the capital, an unfortunate
division of force is the consequence; and if it is decided to throw the
whole army into the Tyrol, leaving the way to Vienna open, there would
be great danger incurred if the enemy is at all enterprising. In Italy,
beyond the Mincio, the parallel method would be of difficult application
on the side of the Tyrol, as well as in Bohemia against an enemy
approaching from Saxony, for the reason that the theater of operations
would be too contracted.

In Prussia the parallel retreat may be used with great advantage against
an army debouching from Bohemia upon the Elbe or the Oder, whilst its
employment would be impossible against a French army moving from the
Rhine, or a Russian army from the Vistula, unless Prussia and Austria
were allies. This is a result of the geographical configuration of the
country, which allows and even favors lateral movements: in the
direction of its greatest dimension, (from Memel to Mayence;) but such a
movement would be disastrous if made from Dresden to Stettin.

When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, a
pursuit always follows.

A retreat, even when executed in the most skillful manner and by an army
in good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army; and
this is particularly the case after a defeat and when the source of
supplies and reinforcements is at a great distance; for a retreat then
becomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and its
difficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy
in conducting the pursuit.

The boldness and activity of the pursuit will depend, of course, upon
the character of the commanders and upon the _physique_ and _morale_ of
the two armies. It is difficult to prescribe fixed rules for all cases
of pursuits, but the following points must be recollected:--

1. It is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of
the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own
country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly
or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. Care must,
however, be taken not to make too large a circuit; for there might
then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely.

2. A pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as
possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained;
because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously
followed up.

3. There are very few cases where it is wise to make a bridge of
gold for the enemy, no matter what the old Roman proverb may say;
for it can scarcely ever be desirable to pay an enemy to leave a
country, unless in the case when an unexpected success shall have
been gained over him by an army much inferior to his in numbers.

Nothing further of importance can be added to what has been said on the
subject of retreats, as far as they are connected with grand
combinations of strategy. We may profitably indicate several tactical
measures which may render them more easy of execution.

One of the surest means of making a retreat successfully is to
familiarize the officers and soldiers with the idea that an enemy may be
resisted quite as well when coming on the rear as on the front, and that
the preservation of order is the only means of saving a body of troops
harassed by the enemy during a retrograde movement. Rigid discipline is
at all times the best preservative of good order, but it is of special
importance during a retreat. To enforce discipline, subsistence must be
furnished, that the troops may not be obliged to straggle off for the
purpose of getting supplies by marauding.

It is a good plan to give the command of the rear-guard to an officer
of great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, in
advance of its movements, examine and select points suitable for
occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. Cavalry can rally so
rapidly on the main body that it is evidently desirable to have
considerable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the
execution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of
thoroughly examining the road itself and the neighborhood, so as to
prevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the
retreating columns.

It is generally sufficient if the rear-guard keep the enemy at the
distance of half a day's march from the main body. The rear-guard would
run great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. When,
however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it may
increase the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march to
the rear; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same
degree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy.
If the army is very numerous and the rear-guard proportionally large, it
may remain a day's march in rear. This will depend, however, upon its
strength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength of
the pursuing force. If the enemy presses up closely, it is of importance
not to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat is
made in good order. In such a case it is a good plan to halt from time
to time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the
Archduke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach, and
Kleber at Ukerath. Such a maneuver almost always succeeds, on account of
the surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body of
troops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies and
spoils.

Passages of rivers in retreat are also operations by no means devoid of
interest. If the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges over
it, the operation is nothing more than the passage of a defile; but when
the river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge,
it is a maneuver of extreme delicacy. Among the precautions to be
taken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so that
they may be out of the way of the army; for this purpose it is well for
the army to halt a half-day's march from the river. The rear-guard
should also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body,--as
far, in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will
permit. The army may thus file across the bridge without being too much
hurried. The march of the rear-guard should be so arranged that it shall
have reached a position in front of the bridge just as the last of the
main body has passed. This will be a suitable moment for relieving the
rear-guard by fresh troops strongly posted. The rear-guard will pass
through the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross the
river; the enemy, coming up and finding fresh troops drawn up to give
him battle, will make no attempt to press them too closely. The new
rear-guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross the
river, breaking the bridges after it.

It is, of course, understood that as fast as the troops pass they form
on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corps
left to hold the enemy in check.

The dangers of such a passage in retreat, and the nature of the
precautions which facilitate it, indicate that measures should always be
taken to throw up intrenchments at the point where the bridge is to be
constructed and the passage made. Where time is not allowed for the
construction of a regular _tete de pont_, a few well-armed redoubts will
be found of great value in covering the retreat of the last troops.

If the passage of a large river is so difficult when the enemy is only
pressing on the rear of the column, it is far more so when the army is
threatened both in front and rear and the river is guarded by the enemy
in force.

The celebrated passage of the Beresina by the French is one of the most
remarkable examples of such an operation. Never was an army in a more
desperate condition, and never was one extricated more gloriously and
skillfully. Pressed by famine, benumbed with cold, distant twelve
hundred miles from its base of operations, assailed by the enemy in
front and in rear, having a river with marshy banks in front, surrounded
by vast forests, how could it hope to escape? It paid dearly for the
honor it gained. The mistake of Admiral Tschitchagoff doubtless helped
its escape; but the army performed heroic deeds, for which due praise
should be given. We do not know whether to admire most the plan of
operations which brought up the Russian armies from the extremities of
Moldavia, from Moscow, and from Polotzk to the Beresina as to a
rendezvous arranged in peace,--a plan which came near effecting the
capture of their formidable adversary,--or the wonderful firmness of the
lion thus pursued, who succeeded in opening a way through his enemies.

The only rules to be laid down are, not to permit your army to be
closely pressed upon, to deceive the enemy as to the point of passage,
and to fall headlong upon the corps which bars the way before the one
which is following the rear of your column can come up. Never place
yourself in a position to be exposed to such danger; for escape in such
a case is rare.

If a retreating army should strive to protect its bridges either by
regular _tetes de font_, or at least by lines of redoubts to cover the
rear-guard, it is natural, also, that the enemy pursuing should use
every effort to destroy the bridges. When the retreat is made down the
bank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also
fire-ships and mills,--a means the Austrians used in 1796 against
Jourdan's army, near Neuwied on the Rhine, where they nearly compromised
the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. The Archduke Charles did the same
thing at Essling in 1809. He broke the bridge over the Danube, and
brought Napoleon to the brink of ruin.

It is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this character
unless there is time for placing a stockade above it. Boats may be
anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floating
bodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 31: Ten years after this first refutation of Bulow's idea, the
concentric retreat of Barclay and Bagration saved the Russian army.
Although it did not prevent Napoleon's first success, it was, in the
end, the cause of his ruin.]

[Footnote 32: In all these calculations I suppose the contending forces
nearly equal. If the invading army is twice as strong as the defensive,
it may be divided into two equal parts, one of which may move directly
upon the capital, while the other may follow the army retiring along the
frontier. If the armies are equal, this is impossible.]





ARTICLE XXXIX.

Of Cantonments, either when on the March, or when established in Winter
Quarters.


So much has been written on this point, and its connection with my
subject is so indirect, that I shall treat it very briefly.

To maintain an army in cantonments, in a war actively carried on, is
generally difficult, however connected the arrangement may be, and there
is almost always some point exposed to the enemy's attacks. A country
where large towns abound, as Lombardy, Saxony, the Netherlands, Swabia,
or old Prussia, presents more facilities for the establishment of
quarters than one where towns are few; for in the former case the troops
have not only convenient supplies of food, but shelters which permit the
divisions of the army to be kept closely together. In Poland, Russia,
portions of Austria and France, in Spain and in Southern Italy, it is
more difficult to put an army into winter quarters.

Formerly, it was usual for each party to go into winter quarters at the
end of October, and all the fighting after that time was of a partisan
character and carried on by the advanced troops forming the outposts.

The surprise of the Austrian winter quarters in Upper Alsace in 1674, by
Turenne, is a good example, from which may be learned the best method of
conducting such an enterprise, and the precautions to be taken on the
other side to prevent its success.

The best rules to be laid down on this subject seem to me to be the
following. Establish the cantonments very compactly and connectedly and
occupying a space as broad as long, in order to avoid having a too
extended line of troops, which is always easily broken through and
cannot be concentrated in time; cover them by a river, or by an outer
line of troops in huts and with their position strengthened by
field-works; fix upon points of assembly which may be reached by all the
troops before the enemy can penetrate so far; keep all the avenues by
which an enemy may approach constantly patrolled by bodies of cavalry;
finally, establish signals to give warning if an attack is made at any
point.

In the winter of 1807, Napoleon established his army in cantonments
behind the Passarge in face of the enemy, the advanced guard alone being
hutted near the cities of Gutstadt, Osterode, &c. The army numbered more
than one hundred and twenty thousand men, and much skill was requisite
in feeding it and keeping it otherwise comfortable in this position
until June. The country was of a favorable character; but this cannot be
expected to be the case everywhere.

An army of one hundred thousand men may find it not very difficult to
have a compact and well-connected system of winter quarters in countries
where large towns are numerous. The difficulty increases with the size
of the army. It must be observed, however, that if the extent of country
occupied increases in proportion to the numbers in the army, the means
of opposing an irruption of the enemy increase in the same proportion.
The important point is to be able to assemble fifty thousand or sixty
thousand men in twenty-four hours. With such an army in hand, and with
the certainty of having it rapidly increased, the enemy may be held in
check, no matter how strong he may be, until the whole army is
assembled.

It must be admitted, however, that there will always be a risk in going
into winter quarters if the enemy keeps his army in a body and seems
inclined to make offensive movements; and the conclusion to be drawn
from this fact is, that the only method of giving secure repose to an
army in winter or in the midst of a campaign is to establish it in
quarters protected by a river, or to arrange an armistice.

In the strategic positions taken up by an army in the course of a
campaign, whether marching, or acting as an army of observation, or
waiting for a favorable opportunity of taking the offensive, it will
probably occupy quite compact cantonments. The selection of such
positions requires great experience upon the part of a general, in order
that he may form correct conclusions as to what he may expect the enemy
to do. An army should occupy space enough to enable it to subsist
readily, and it should also keep as much concentrated as possible, to be
ready for the enemy should he show himself; and these two conditions are
by no means easily reconciled. There is no better arrangement than to
place the divisions of the army in a space nearly a square, so that in
case of need the whole may be assembled at any point where the enemy may
present himself. Nine divisions placed in this way, a half-day's march
from each other, may in twelve hours assemble on the center. The same
rules are to be observed in these cases as were laid down for winter
quarters.




ARTICLE XL.

Descents.


These are operations of rare occurrence, and may be classed as among the
most difficult in war when effected in presence of a well-prepared
enemy.

Since the invention of gunpowder and the changes effected by it in
navies, transports are so helpless in presence of the monstrous
three-deckers of the present day, armed as they are with a hundred
cannon, that an army can make a descent only with the assistance of a
numerous fleet of ships of war which can command the sea, at least until
the debarkation of the army takes place.

Before the invention of gunpowder, the transports were also the ships of
war; they were moved along at pleasure by using oars, were light, and
could skirt along the coasts; their number was in proportion to the
number of troops to be embarked; and, aside from the danger of tempests,
the operations of a fleet could be arranged with almost as much
certainty as those of an army on land. Ancient history, for these
reasons, gives us examples of more extensive debarkations than modern
times.

Who does not recall to mind the immense forces transported by the
Persians upon the Black Sea, the Bosporus, and the Archipelago,--the
innumerable hosts landed in Greece by Xerxes and Darius,--the great
expeditions of the Carthaginians and Romans to Spain and Sicily, that of
Alexander into Asia Minor, those of Caesar to England and Africa, that
of Germanicus to the mouths of the Elbe,--the Crusades,--the expeditions
of the Northmen to England, to France, and even to Italy?

Since the invention of cannon, the too celebrated Armada of Philip II.
was the only enterprise of this kind of any magnitude until that set on
foot by Napoleon against England in 1803. All other marine expeditions
were of no great extent: as, for example, those of Charles V. and of
Sebastian of Portugal to the coast of Africa; also the several descents
of the French into the United States of America, into Egypt and St.
Domingo, of the English to Egypt, Holland, Copenhagen, Antwerp,
Philadelphia. I say nothing of Hoche's projected landing in Ireland; for
that was a failure, and is, at the same time, an example of the
difficulties to be apprehended in such attempts.

The large armies kept on foot in our day by the great states of the
world prevent descents with thirty or forty thousand men, except against
second-rate powers; for it is extremely difficult to find transportation
for one hundred or one hundred and fifty thousand men with their immense
trains of artillery, munitions, cavalry, &c.

We were, however, on the point of seeing the solution of the vast
problem of the practicability of descents in great force, if it is true
that Napoleon seriously contemplated the transportation of one hundred
and sixty thousand veterans from Boulogne to the British Isles:
unfortunately, his failure to execute this gigantic undertaking has left
us entirely in the dark as to this grave question.

It is not impossible to collect fifty French ships-of-the-line in the
Channel by misleading the English; this was, in fact, upon the point of
being done; it is then no longer impossible, with a favorable wind, to
pass over the flotilla in two days and effect a landing. But what would
become of the army if a storm should disperse the fleet of ships of war
and the English should return in force to the Channel and defeat the
fleet or oblige it to regain its ports?

Posterity will regret, as the loss of an example to all future
generations, that this immense undertaking was not carried through, or
at least attempted. Doubtless, many brave men would have met their
deaths; but were not those men mowed down more uselessly on the plains
of Swabia, of Moravia, and of Castile, in the mountains of Portugal and
the forests of Lithuania? What man would not glory in assisting to bring
to a conclusion the greatest trial of skill and strength ever seen
between two great nations? At any rate, posterity will find in the
preparations made for this descent one of the most valuable lessons the
present century has furnished for the study of soldiers and of
statesmen. The labors of every kind performed on the coasts of France
from 1803 to 1805 will be among the most remarkable monuments of the
activity, foresight, and skill of Napoleon. It is recommended to the
careful attention of young officers. But, while admitting the
possibility of success for a great descent upon a coast so near as the
English to Boulogne, what results should be expected if this armada had
had a long sea-voyage to make? How could so many small vessels be kept
moving, even for two days and nights? To what chances of ruin would not
so many frail boats be exposed in navigating the open seas! Moreover,
the artillery, munitions of war, equipments, provisions, and fresh water
that must be carried with this multitude of men require immense labor in
preparation and vast means of transportation.

Experience has shown clearly the difficulties attending such an
expedition, even for thirty thousand men. From known facts, it is
evident that a descent can be made with this number of men in four
cases:--1st, against colonies or isolated possessions; 2d, against
second-rate powers which cannot be immediately supported from abroad;
3d, for the purpose of effecting a temporary diversion, or to capture a
position which it is important to hold for a time; 4th, to make a
diversion, at once political and military, against a state already
engaged in a great war, whose troops are occupied at a distance from the
point of the descent.

It is difficult to lay down rules for operations of this character.
About the only recommendations I can make are the following. Deceive
the enemy as to the point of landing; choose a spot where the vessels
may anchor in safety and the troops be landed together; infuse as much
activity as possible into the operation, and take possession of some
strong point to cover the development of the troops as they land; put on
shore at once a part of the artillery, to give confidence and protection
to the troops that have landed.