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The Art of War written by Baron Henri de Jomini

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When we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and
the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to
regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a
single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought
to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In
my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to
confirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the
columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six
roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened;
but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the
routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the
enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of the
Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the
center, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to
divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march.

The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much
greater and more difficult task than where a denouement may be
accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of
battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous
region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it
would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow
and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the
invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or
three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated,
the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the
junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should be
driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys.

Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland would
be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with
their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple
number.

To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with
localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies,
would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best
school for this kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 by
the Archduke Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in my
History of the Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of
the Grisons by Segur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr
and Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and the
passage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good guides in this
study.




ARTICLE XXIX.

Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.


There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those
which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The
second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of
country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile.
The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea
by means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the
seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includes
the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great,
but where a powerful state is attacked.

As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the
Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly
be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of
these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its
base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the
same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of
defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their
arsenals;--while in the other case its resources would be upon the
Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad
fate of many of these great invasions.

In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is
merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own
interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in
the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of
all the armies,--particularly if he belong to the state which is not a
principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. General
Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty
thousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in the
mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand
men brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus
found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity
of Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his
misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of
about seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been
hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. The
battle of Austerlitz--due to a fault of Weyrother--endangered the
Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost became
the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the
opportunity of regaining its own country.

The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the
expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at Bergen in
Holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander
under such circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was less
disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his
communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in
no respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of
the French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great
abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were
allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political
ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension
which may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have
been cited in Article XIX., on political objective points.

History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions
across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with
forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were
necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to
the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran
empires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery
and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly
since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer
together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining
each other, no such events have taken place.

Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the
Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of
Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been
scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of
Charles XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions;
for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in
Germany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the
Swedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and,
besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no
one but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe
from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will be
imitated.

Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all
invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the
same operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from
these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of
operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones
applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable,
although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812,
although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His
care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while
Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered
Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that he
had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself
safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply
on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success.

If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic
precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of
troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at
Wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was
unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which
that general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do
not speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after the
conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune;
although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place
immediately. He has also been accused of having too much despised
distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin.
Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to
know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of
wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been
possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without having
previously defeated the Russian army.

It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of
Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a _denouement_
between Wilna and the Dwina. Although he fully appreciated the bravery
of the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the
people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and
sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have
given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia,
he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and
enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the
greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm.

The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point
for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never
to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance
of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a
proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which
may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of
resuming the offensive." As to the precautions to be observed in these
operations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on the
safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual
bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to
these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles,
seasons, and countries,--in short, accuracy in calculation and
moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried
too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can
insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five
or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly
ruined nations and armies.

Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been
rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in
date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the
sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers,
has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships,
but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions.

It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now
is very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest
of Greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when
Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his
fleet coasted the shore.

Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that
the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of
immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert.
Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress
depends upon the winds,--which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind
of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare
occurrence.

The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of
operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are
the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations
of war.

Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones,
are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking
Cadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon
the Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the
Tagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of
Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going
as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable
troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all
be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be
undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in
view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general.
Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions
as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in
Article VI., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not
be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change of
policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that
day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551,
and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the
strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their
co-operation cannot be obtained.


EPITOME OF STRATEGY

* * * * *

The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled
by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which
enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the
definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important
operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that
we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. Therefore, before treating
of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations
of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of
which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made.

By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will
be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give
a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.

From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the
manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters
of operations is found in what follows:--

1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the
reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in
accordance with Article XVIII.

2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic
field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy
with the least risk to one's self.

3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of
operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke
Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for
retreats parallel to the frontiers.

On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success
of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the
extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was
successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations
upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined
by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims
presented in Article XXI.

4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them
such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the
forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from
affording each other mutual support.

5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic
positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important
strategic points of the theater of war.

6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and
activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may
be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of
the hostile army.

The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an
army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the
enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will
be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive
strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to
the enemy can be given.

However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive
course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with
attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and
successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy,
thus insuring their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly and
continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of
gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom.

The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths most
satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in 1793, already
mentioned in Article XXIV., and the details of which may be found in
Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Forty
battalions, carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, and
Landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four
victories and saved France. The whole science of marches would have been
found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive
strategic point. The Austrian was then the principal army of the
Coalition, and its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was upon
the Meuse that a general effort of the French would have inflicted the
most severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the most
pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic
principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most
decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at Ratisbon.
The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples.

It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be
able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of
war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own
country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and
of _tetes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the great
decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of
the science. We have already seen how we are to recognize these lines
and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. Napoleon has
afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the Simplon and
Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has profited by it in the roads from
the Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as by
different fortified places projected or completed.




CHAPTER IV.

GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.


Battles are the actual conflicts of armies contending about great
questions of national policy and of strategy. Strategy directs armies to
the decisive points of a zone of operations, and influences, in advance,
the results of battles; but tactics, aided by courage, by genius and
fortune, gains victories.

Grand tactics is the art of making good combinations preliminary to
battles, as well as during their progress. The guiding principle in
tactical combinations, as in those of strategy, is to bring the mass of
the force in hand against a part of the opposing army, and upon that
point the possession of which promises the most important results.

Battles have been stated by some writers to be the chief and deciding
features of war. This assertion is not strictly true, as armies have
been destroyed by strategic operations without the occurrence of pitched
battles, by a succession of inconsiderable affairs. It is also true that
a complete and decided victory may give rise to results of the same
character when there may have been no grand strategic combinations.

The results of a battle generally depend upon a union of causes which
are not always within the scope of the military art: the nature of the
order of battle adopted, the greater or less wisdom displayed in the
plan of the battle, as well as the manner of carrying out its details,
the more or less loyal and enlightened co-operation of the officers
subordinate to the commander-in-chief, the cause of the contest, the
proportions and quality of the troops, their greater or less enthusiasm,
superiority on the one side or the other in artillery or cavalry, and
the manner of handling these arms; but it is the _morale_ of armies, as
well as of nations, more than any thing else, which makes victories and
their results decisive. Clausewitz commits a grave error in asserting
that a battle not characterized by a maneuver to turn the enemy cannot
result in a complete victory. At the battle of Zama, Hannibal, in a few
brief hours, saw the fruits of twenty years of glory and success vanish
before his eyes, although Scipio never had a thought of turning his
position. At Rivoli the turning-party was completely beaten; nor was the
maneuver more successful at Stockach in 1799, or at Austerlitz in 1805.
As is evident from Article XXXII., I by no means intend to discourage
the use of that maneuver, being, on the contrary, a constant advocate of
it; but it is very important to know how to use it skillfully and
opportunely, and I am, moreover, of opinion that if it be a general's
design to make himself master of his enemy's communications while at the
same time holding his own, he would do better to employ strategic than
tactical combinations to accomplish it.

There are three kinds of battles: 1st, defensive battles, or those
fought by armies in favorable positions taken up to await the enemy's
attack; 2d, offensive battles, where one army attacks another in
position; 3d, battles fought unexpectedly, and resulting from the
collision of two armies meeting on the march. We will examine in
succession the different combinations they present.




ARTICLE XXX.

Positions and Defensive Battles.


When an army awaits an attack, it takes up a position and forms its line
of battle. From the general definitions given at the beginning of this
work, it will appear that I make a distinction between _lines of battle_
and _orders of battle_,--things which have been constantly confounded. I
will designate as a _line of battle_ the position occupied by
battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will
take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will
await attack, having no particular project in view for the future: it is
the right name to give to a body of troops formed with proper tactical
intervals and distances upon one or more lines, as will be more fully
explained in Article XLIII. On the contrary, I will designate as an
_order of battle_ an arrangement of troops indicating an intention to
execute a certain maneuver; as, for example, the parallel order, the
oblique order, the perpendicular order.

This nomenclature, although new, seems necessary to keeping up a proper
distinction between two things which should by no means be
confounded.[22] From the nature of the two things, it is evident that
the _line of battle_ belongs especially to defensive arrangements;
because an army awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will
be must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of
battle. _Order of battle_, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of
troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some
maneuver previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to
offensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended that the
line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement; for a body of
troops may in this formation very well proceed to the attack of a
position, while an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or
any other. I refer above only to ordinary cases.