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The Art of War written by Baron Henri de Jomini

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THE

ART OF WAR

BY

BARON DE JOMINI,

GENERAL AND AID-DE-CAMP OF THE EMPEROR OF RUSSIA.

A New Edition, with Appendices and Maps.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH

BY

Capt. G.H. MENDELL,

CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY,

AND

Lieut. W.P. CRAIGHILL,

CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ARMY.


Originally published in 1862




PREFACE.


In the execution of any undertaking there are extremes on either hand
which are alike to be avoided. The rule holds in a special manner in
making a translation. There is, on the one side, the extreme of too
rigid adherence, word for word and line for line, to the original, and
on the other is the danger of using too free a pen. In either case the
sense of the author may not be truly given. It is not always easy to
preserve a proper mean between these extremes. The translators of
Jomini's Summary of the Principles of the Art of War have endeavored to
render their author into plain English, without mutilating or adding to
his ideas, attempting no display and making no criticisms.

To persons accustomed to read for instruction in military matters, it is
not necessary to say a word with reference to the merits of Jomini. To
those not thus accustomed heretofore, but who are becoming more
interested in such subjects, (and this class must include the great mass
of the American public,) it is sufficient to say, and it may be said
with entire truth, that General Jomini is admitted by all competent
judges to be one of the ablest military critics and historians of this
or any other day.

The translation now presented to the people has been made with the
earnest hope and the sincere expectation of its proving useful. As the
existence of a large, well-instructed standing army is deemed
incompatible with our institutions, it becomes the more important that
military information be as extensively diffused as possible among the
people. If by the present work the translators shall find they have
contributed, even in an inconsiderable degree, to this important object,
they will be amply repaid for the care and labor expended upon it.

To those persons to whom the study of the art of war is a new one, it is
recommended to begin at the article "Strategy," Chapter III., from that
point to read to the end of the Second Appendix, and then to return to
Chapters I. and II. It should be borne in mind that this subject, to be
appreciated, must be studied, map in hand: this remark is especially
true of strategy. An acquaintance with the campaigns of Napoleon I. is
quite important, as they are constantly referred to by Jomini and by all
other recent writers on the military art.

U.S. Military Academy,
West Point, N.Y.
January, 1862.




CONTENTS.


TRANSLATORS' PREFACE.


DEFINITIONS OF THE BRANCHES OF THE ART OF WAR.


CHAPTER I. THE RELATION OF DIPLOMACY TO WAR.

ART. I.--Offensive Wars to Recover Rights.

ART. II.--Wars which are Politically Defensive, and Offensive in a
Military View.

ART. III.--Wars of Expediency.

ART. IV.--Wars with or without Allies.

ART. V.--Wars of Intervention.

ART. VI.--Wars of Invasion, through a Desire of Conquest or for other
Causes.

ART. VII.--Wars of Opinion.

ART. VIII.--National Wars.

ART. IX.--Civil and Religious Wars.

ART. X.--Double Wars, and the Danger of Undertaking Two at the Same Time.


CHAPTER II. MILITARY POLICY.

ART. XI.--Military Statistics and Geography.

ART. XII.--Different Causes which have an Influence over the Success of a
War.

ART. XIII.--The Military Institutions of States.

ART. XIV.--The Command of Armies and the Supreme Control of Operations.

ART. XV.--The Military Spirit of Nations and the Morale of Armies.



CHAPTER III. STRATEGY.
Definition of Strategy and Tactics.
THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF WAR.

ART. XVI.--The System of Offensive or Defensive Operations.

ART. XVII.--The Theater of Operations.

ART. XVIII.--Bases of Operations.

ART. XIX.--Strategic Lines and Points, Decisive Points of the Theater
of War, and Objective Points of Operation.

ART. XX.--Fronts of Operations, Strategic Fronts, Lines of Defense,
and Strategic Positions.

ART. XXI.--Zones and Lines of Operations.

ART. XXII.--Strategic Lines of Maneuver.

ART. XXIII.--Means of Protecting Lines of Operations by Temporary Bases
or Strategic Reserves.

ART. XXIV.--The Old and New Systems of War.

ART. XXV.--Depots of Supply, and their Relations to Operations.

ART. XXVI.--Frontiers, and their Defense by Forts and Intrenched
Lines.--Wars of Sieges.

ART. XXVII.--Intrenched Camps and Tetes de Ponts in their Relation to
Strategy.

ART. XXVIII.--Strategic Operations in Mountainous Countries.

ART. XXIX.--Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.

Epitome of Strategy.


CHAPTER IV. GRAND TACTICS AND BATTLES.

ART. XXX.--Positions and Defensive Battles.

ART. XXXI.--Offensive Battles and Orders of Battle.

ART. XXXII.--Turning Maneuvers, and Too Extended Movements in Battle.

ART. XXXIII.--Unexpected Meeting of Two Armies on the March.

ART. XXXIV.--Surprises of Armies.

ART. XXXV.--Attack of Cities, Intrenched Camps or Lines, and Coups de
Main generally.


CHAPTER V. SEVERAL OPERATIONS OF A MIXED CHARACTER, WHICH ARE PARTLY IN
THE DOMAIN OF STRATEGY AND PARTLY OF TACTICS.

ART. XXXVI.--Diversions and Great Detachments.

ART. XXXVII.--Passage of Rivers and other Streams.

ART. XXXVIII.--Retreats and Pursuits.

ART. XXXIX.--Cantonments and Winter Quarters.

ART. XL.--Descents, or Maritime Expeditions.


CHAPTER VI. LOGISTICS, OR THE PRACTICAL ART OF MOVING ARMIES.

ART. XLI.--A few Remarks on Logistics in general.

ART. XLII.--Reconnoissances, and other Means of Gaining Accurate
Information of the Enemy's Movements.


CHAPTER VII. FORMATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS FOR BATTLE.

ART. ART. XLIII--Posting Troops in Line of Battle.

ART. XLIV.--Formation and Employment of Infantry.

ART. XLV.---Formation and Employment of Cavalry.

ART. XLVI.---Formation and Employment of Artillery.

ART. XLVII.--Employment of the Three Arms together.


CONCLUSION.

SUPPLEMENT.

APPENDIX.

SECOND APPENDIX.

SKETCH OF THE PRINCIPAL MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.



SUMMARY OF

THE ART OF WAR.


DEFINITION OF THE ART OF WAR.


The art of war, as generally considered, consists of five purely
military branches,--viz.: Strategy, Grand Tactics, Logistics,
Engineering, and Tactics. A sixth and essential branch, hitherto
unrecognized, might be termed _Diplomacy in its relation to War_.
Although this branch is more naturally and intimately connected with the
profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be
denied that, if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is
indispensable to every general commanding an army: it enters into all
the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the
various operations to be undertaken in this war; and, in this view, it
should have a place in a work like this.

To recapitulate, the art of war consists of six distinct parts:--

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.

2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of
war, either for defense or for invasion.

3. Grand Tactics.

4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.

5. Engineering,--the attack and defense of fortifications.

6. Minor Tactics.

It is proposed to analyze the principal combinations of the first four
branches, omitting the consideration of tactics and of the art of
engineering.

Familiarity with all these parts is not essential in order to be a good
infantry, cavalry, or artillery officer; but for a general, or for a
staff officer, this knowledge is indispensable.




CHAPTER I.

STATESMANSHIP IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.


Under this head are included those considerations from which a statesman
concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and
determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the
war.

A government goes to war,--

To reclaim certain rights or to defend them;

To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce,
manufactures, or agriculture;

To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the
safety of the government or the balance of power;

To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;

To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to
defend them;

To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of
territory;

To defend the threatened independence of the state;

To avenge insulted honor; or,

From a mania for conquest.

It may be remarked that these different kinds of war influence in some
degree the nature and extent of the efforts and operations necessary for
the proposed end. The party who has provoked the war may be reduced to
the defensive, and the party assailed may assume the offensive; and
there may be other circumstances which will affect the nature and
conduct of a war, as,--

1. A state may simply make war against another state.

2. A state may make war against several states in alliance with each
other.

3. A state in alliance with another may make war upon a single enemy.

4. A state may be either the principal party or an auxiliary.

5. In the latter case a state may join in the struggle at its beginning
or after it has commenced.

6. The theater of war may be upon the soil of the enemy, upon that of an
ally, or upon its own.

7. If the war be one of invasion, it may be upon adjacent or distant
territory: it may be prudent and cautious, or it may be bold and
adventurous.

8. It may be a national war, either against ourselves or against the
enemy.

9. The war may be a civil or a religious war.

War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the
art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the
operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances
of the case.

For example: two hundred thousand French wishing to subjugate the
Spanish people, united to a man against them, would not maneuver as the
same number of French in a march upon Vienna, or any other capital, to
compel a peace; nor would a French army fight the guerrillas of Mina as
they fought the Russians at Borodino; nor would a French army venture to
march upon Vienna without considering what might be the tone and temper
of the governments and communities between the Rhine and the Inn, or
between the Danube and the Elbe. A regiment should always fight in
nearly the same way; but commanding generals must be guided by
circumstances and events.

To these different combinations, which belong more or less to
statesmanship, may be added others which relate solely to the management
of armies. The name Military Policy is given to them; for they belong
exclusively neither to diplomacy nor to strategy, but are still of the
highest importance in the plans both of a statesman and a general.




ARTICLE I.

Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights.


When a state has claims upon another, it may not always be best to
enforce them by arms. The public interest must be consulted before
action.

The most just war is one which is founded upon undoubted rights, and
which, in addition, promises to the state advantages commensurate with
the sacrifices required and the hazards incurred. Unfortunately, in our
times there are so many doubtful and contested rights that most wars,
though apparently based upon bequests, or wills, or marriages, are in
reality but wars of expediency. The question of the succession to the
Spanish crown under Louis XIV. was very clear, since it was plainly
settled by a solemn will, and was supported by family ties and by the
general consent of the Spanish nation; yet it was stoutly contested by
all Europe, and produced a general coalition against the legitimate
legatee.

Frederick II., while Austria and France were at war, brought forward an
old claim, entered Silesia in force and seized this province, thus
doubling the power of Prussia. This was a stroke of genius; and, even if
he had failed, he could not have been much censured; for the grandeur
and importance of the enterprise justified him in his attempt, as far as
such attempts can be justified.

In wars of this nature no rules can be laid down. To watch and to profit
by every circumstance covers all that can be said. Offensive movements
should be suitable to the end to be attained. The most natural step
would be to occupy the disputed territory: then offensive operations may
be carried on according to circumstances and to the respective strength
of the parties, the object being to secure the cession of the territory
by the enemy, and the means being to threaten him in the heart of his
own country. Every thing depends upon the alliances the parties may be
able to secure with other states, and upon their military resources. In
an offensive movement, scrupulous care must be exercised not to arouse
the jealousy of any other state which might come to the aid of the
enemy. It is a part of the duty of a statesman to foresee this chance,
and to obviate it by making proper explanations and giving proper
guarantees to other states.




ARTICLE II.

Of Wars Defensive Politically, and Offensive in a Military Point of
View.


A state attacked by another which renews an old claim rarely yields it
without a war: it prefers to defend its territory, as is always more
honorable. But it may be advantageous to take the offensive, instead of
awaiting the attack on the frontiers.

There are often advantages in a war of invasion: there are also
advantages in awaiting the enemy upon one's own soil. A power with no
internal dissensions, and under no apprehension of an attack by a third
party, will always find it advantageous to carry the war upon hostile
soil. This course will spare its territory from devastation, carry on
the war at the expense of the enemy, excite the ardor of its soldiers,
and depress the spirits of the adversary. Nevertheless, in a purely
military sense, it is certain that an army operating in its own
territory, upon a theater of which all the natural and artificial
features are well known, where all movements are aided by a knowledge of
the country, by the favor of the citizens, and the aid of the
constituted authorities, possesses great advantages.

These plain truths have their application in all descriptions of war;
but, if the principles of strategy are always the same, it is different
with the political part of war, which is modified by the tone of
communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of
states and armies. The fact of these modifications has been used to
prove that war knows no rules. Military science rests upon principles
which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and
skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these
variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to
execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed.

For instance, the plan of a war against France, Austria, or Russia would
differ widely from one against the brave but undisciplined bands of
Turks, which cannot be kept in order, are not able to maneuver well, and
possess no steadiness under misfortunes.




ARTICLE III.

Wars of Expediency.


The invasion of Silesia by Frederick II., and the war of the Spanish
Succession, were wars of expediency.

There are two kinds of wars of expediency: first, where a powerful state
undertakes to acquire natural boundaries for commercial and political
reasons; secondly, to lessen the power of a dangerous rival or to
prevent his aggrandizement. These last are wars of intervention; for a
state will rarely singly attack a dangerous rival: it will endeavor to
form a coalition for that purpose.

These views belong rather to statesmanship or diplomacy than to war.




ARTICLE IV.

Of Wars with or without Allies.


Of course, in a war an ally is to be desired, all other things being
equal. Although a great state will more probably succeed than two weaker
states in alliance against it, still the alliance is stronger than
either separately. The ally not only furnishes a contingent of troops,
but, in addition, annoys the enemy to a great degree by threatening
portions of his frontier which otherwise would have been secure. All
history teaches that no enemy is so insignificant as to be despised and
neglected by any power, however formidable.





ARTICLE V.

Wars of Intervention.


To interfere in a contest already begun promises more advantages to a
state than war under any other circumstances; and the reason is plain.
The power which interferes throws upon one side of the scale its whole
weight and influence; it interferes at the most opportune moment, when
it can make decisive use of its resources.

There are two kinds of intervention: 1. Intervention in the internal
affairs of neighboring states; 2. Intervention in external relations.

Whatever may be said as to the moral character of interventions of the
first class, instances are frequent. The Romans acquired power by these
interferences, and the empire of the English India Company was assured
in a similar manner. These interventions are not always successful.
While Russia has added to her power by interference with Poland,
Austria, on the contrary, was almost ruined by her attempt to interfere
in the internal affairs of France during the Revolution.

Intervention in the external relations of states is more legitimate, and
perhaps more advantageous. It may be doubtful whether a nation has the
right to interfere in the internal affairs of another people; but it
certainly has a right to oppose it when it propagates disorder which may
reach the adjoining states.

There are three reasons for intervention in exterior foreign
wars,--viz.: 1, by virtue of a treaty which binds to aid; 2, to maintain
the political equilibrium; 3, to avoid certain evil consequences of the
war already commenced, or to secure certain advantages from the war not
to be obtained otherwise.

History is filled with examples of powers which have fallen by neglect
of these principles. "A state begins to decline when it permits the
immoderate aggrandizement of a rival, and a secondary power may become
the arbiter of nations if it throw its weight into the balance at the
proper time."

In a military view, it seems plain that the sudden appearance of a new
and large army as a third party in a well-contested war must be
decisive. Much will depend upon its geographical position in reference
to the armies already in the field. For example, in the winter of 1807
Napoleon crossed the Vistula and ventured to the walls of Koenigsberg,
leaving Austria on his rear and having Russia in front. If Austria had
launched an army of one hundred thousand men from Bohemia upon the Oder,
it is probable that the power of Napoleon would have been ended; there
is every reason to think that his army could not have regained the
Rhine. Austria preferred to wait till she could raise four hundred
thousand men. Two years afterward, with this force she took the field,
and was beaten; while one hundred thousand men well employed at the
proper time would have decided the fate of Europe.

There are several kinds of war resulting from these two different
interventions:--

1. Where the intervention is merely auxiliary, and with a force
specified by former treaties.

2. Where the intervention is to uphold a feeble neighbor by defending
his territory, thus shifting the scene of war to other soil.

3. A state interferes as a principal party when near the theater of
war,--which supposes the case of a coalition of several powers against
one.

4. A state interferes either in a struggle already in progress, or
interferes before the declaration of war.

When a state intervenes with only a small contingent, in obedience to
treaty-stipulations, it is simply an accessory, and has but little voice
in the main operations; but when it intervenes as a principal party, and
with an imposing force, the case is quite different.

The military chances in these wars are varied. The Russian army in the
Seven Years' War was in fact auxiliary to that of Austria and France:
still, it was a principal party in the North until its occupation of
Prussia. But when Generals Fermor and Soltikoff conducted the army as
far as Brandenburg it acted solely in the interest of Austria: the fate
of these troops, far from their base, depended upon the good or bad
maneuvering of their allies.

Such distant excursions are dangerous, and generally delicate
operations. The campaigns of 1799 and 1805 furnish sad illustrations of
this, to which we shall again refer in Article XXIX., in discussing the
military character of these expeditions.

It follows, then, that the safety of the army may be endangered by these
distant interventions. The counterbalancing advantage is that its own
territory cannot then be easily invaded, since the scene of hostilities
is so distant; so that what may be a misfortune for the general may be,
in a measure, an advantage to the state.

In wars of this character the essentials are to secure a general who is
both a statesman and a soldier; to have clear stipulations with the
allies as to the part to be taken by each in the principal operations;
finally, to agree upon an objective point which shall be in harmony with
the common interests. By the neglect of these precautions, the greater
number of coalitions have failed, or have maintained a difficult
struggle with a power more united but weaker than the allies.

The third kind of intervention, which consists in interfering with the
whole force of the state and near to its frontiers, is more promising
than the others. Austria had an opportunity of this character in 1807,
but failed to profit by it: she again had the opportunity in 1813.
Napoleon had just collected his forces in Saxony, when Austria, taking
his front of operations in reverse, threw herself into the struggle with
two hundred thousand men, with almost perfect certainty of success. She
regained in two months the Italian empire and her influence in Germany,
which had been lost by fifteen years of disaster. In this intervention
Austria had not only the political but also the military chances in her
favor,--a double result, combining the highest advantages.

Her success was rendered more certain by the fact that while the theater
was sufficiently near her frontiers to permit the greatest possible
display of force, she at the same time interfered in a contest already
in progress, upon which she entered with the whole of her resources and
at the time most opportune for her.

This double advantage is so decisive that it permits not only powerful
monarchies, but even small states, to exercise a controlling influence
when they know how to profit by it.

Two examples may establish this. In 1552, the Elector Maurice of Saxony
boldly declared war against Charles V., who was master of Spain, Italy,
and the German empire, and had been victorious over Francis I. and held
France in his grasp. This movement carried the war into the Tyrol, and
arrested the great conqueror in his career.

In 1706, the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, by declaring himself hostile
to Louis XIV., changed the state of affairs in Italy, and caused the
recall of the French army from the banks of the Adige to the walls of
Turin, where it encountered the great catastrophe which immortalized
Prince Eugene.

Enough has been said to illustrate the importance and effect of these
opportune interventions: more illustrations might be given, but they
could not add to the conviction of the reader.




ARTICLE VI.

Aggressive Wars for Conquest and other Reasons.


There are two very different kinds of invasion: one attacks an adjoining
state; the other attacks a distant point, over intervening territory of
great extent whose inhabitants may be neutral, doubtful, or hostile.

Wars of conquest, unhappily, are often prosperous,--as Alexander, Caesar,
and Napoleon during a portion of his career, have fully proved. However,
there are natural limits in these wars, which cannot be passed without
incurring great disaster. Cambyses in Nubia, Darius in Scythia, Crassus
and the Emperor Julian among the Parthians, and Napoleon in Russia,
furnish bloody proofs of these truths.--The love of conquest, however,
was not the only motive with Napoleon: his personal position, and his
contest with England, urged him to enterprises the aim of which was to
make him supreme. It is true that he loved war and its chances; but he
was also a victim to the necessity of succeeding in his efforts or of
yielding to England. It might be said that he was sent into this world
to teach generals and statesmen what they should avoid. His victories
teach what may be accomplished by activity, boldness, and skill; his
disasters, what might have been avoided by prudence.